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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ARVIN L. BELLON, MAURINE G, 
BELLON, B. CURTIS DASTRUP, 
LANIS B. DASTRUP, and 
A. LABRUM & SONS, INC., 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
vs. 
MARVEL L. MALNAR, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 
the provisions of Section 78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Annotated, and 
Rule 3a, Rules of Utah Supreme Court, and Section 3 and Section 5 
of Article VIII of the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a final Judgment of the District 
Court of Duchesne County, Honorable Boyd Bunnell presiding. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues presented by this appeal are as follows: 
A. Did the Court err in failing to enforce the 
liquidated damages clause of the Real Estate Contract on the basis 
that plaintiffs had suffered an unconscionable forfeiture? 
Specifically, did the actual damages suffered by defendant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 88-0226 
(seller) as delineated in Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Ut 468, 
243 P2d 446 (Utah, 1952), to-wit, 
1. Loss of bargain, 
2. Damage to, or depreciation to property, 
3. Unpaid interest, 
4. Unpaid taxes and water assessments, 
exceed the liquidated damages amount so that liquidated damages 
clause should be enforced? (Point I.) 
B. Did the Court err in failing to follow the doctrine 
of Perkins v. Spencer and subsequent cases applying the same and 
in substituting its own theory of damages? Specifically, did the 
Court err in allowing the buyer credit for the increased value, if 
any, of the land at the time of forfeiture over the contract as 
though the return of the land to the seller constituted a payment 
to seller? Did the Court err in considering in effect eminent 
domain proceeds received by seller over one year after forfeiture 
as a payment on the contract? (Point II.) 
C. Did the Court err in quieting title to the six-acre 
tract in plaintiffs, or should the Court have determined that the 
six acres, although greatly reduced in value (by reason of 
encumbrances and the necessity of a quit-title action) still 
belong to the defendant? (Point III.) 
D. Is the value of the 76 acres, which is in excess of 
the purchase price, relevant (assuming there is such an excess)? 
If so, what is the determinative time for such valuation and what 
was the value of the land at that time? (Point IV.) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS WHERE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
Not applicable. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE. This is an action by plaintiffs/ 
respondents seeking return of moneys paid under the real estate 
contract on the basis of an alleged unconscionable forfeiture. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. The case was tried to Judge Boyd 
Bunnell, without a jury, being an equity case. At the conclusion 
of the evidence, the Court directed that the parties make their 
closing arguments by written memoranda, rather than orally, and 
such were duly submitted by the parties. (R. 48-127) 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT. Thereafter, the Court 
rendered a Memorandum Decision dated April 7, 1988, and entered on 
April 20, 1988, (R. 163-9) ruling that defendant was required to 
reimburse plaintiffs the sum of $71,183.14, and in addition 
quieting title in plaintiffs to six acres of the land covered by 
the real estate contract. 
Thereafter, proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment were submitted, and defendant filed numerous 
objections thereto (R. 171-197) and requested oral argument of 
said objections. Oral argument was not permitted. The Court 
directed that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
"eliminate any reference to prejudgment interest" and directed 
that paragraph 5 should be amended to show that "a copy of the 
warranty deed was placed with the escrow holder," rather than the 
original. With those changes. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment were—duly entered on May 17, 1988. (R. 128-144) 
Notice of Appeal was served and filed by defendant in 
the Duchesne County Clerk's office on June 10, 1988. (R. 206) 
Plaintiffs filed Notice of Crossappeal on June 22, 1988. (R. 217) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 19, 1980, plaintiffs1 predecessor in 
interest, Ferron Elder, as buyer, entered into a Real Estate 
Contract with defendant, Marvel Malnar, as seller, for sale of 76 
acres of land in Duchesne County, Utah, together with 12 shares of 
water, for the total purchase price of $152,000. (Ex. 5, T. 36, 
T. 232) Paragraph 12A of the contract contained forfeiture and 
liquidated damage provisions. (A copy of the contract is included 
in the Addendum hereto.) At that time a down payment of $23,500 
was paid (T. 41), and a Warranty Deed to said property made out to 
the buyer was placed in escrow, to be delivered to the buyer when 
all payments on the Contract had been made. (T. 78) At the same 
time a Quit-claim Deed (covering all 76 acres and water shares) 
from the buyer to the seller was placed in escrow, to be returned 
to seller and recorded in the event of default of the buyer. (Ex. 
10, T. 76) A Warranty Deed to six acres out of the 76 Wcis also 
executed by defendant to said buyer and was to have been placed in 
escrow, to be released if and when certain additional principal 
payments as provided in the Contract were made, but the Deed was 
recorded by the title company who closed the transaction (Ex, 11, 
Ex. 5, T. 36, 70) without collecting the additional payments as 
required by the contract. (Ex. 5, T. 47-8) 
Twelve days after the Real Estate Contract was entered 
into, Ferron Elder entered into a separate Real Estate Contract 
with four third-parties (hereinfter referred to by their last 
names, to-wit, Jenkins, McCarver, Mabey and Johnson) covering the 
same property with a purchase price of $266,000. (Ex. 9, T.39) 
The Uniform Real Estate Contract between Malnar and 
Elder provided for annual payments of $26,395.18, and the first 
annual payment which was due in December 1981 was paid in January 
1982, of which $13,991.37 was applied on interest and $12,403.81 
was applied on principal. The second annual payment due December 
1982 was paid in February 1983, of which $12,118.53 was applied 
on interest and $14,276.65 was applied on principal, leaving a 
principal balance due as of February 1, 1983, of $101,919.54. 
(Ex. 25, T. 75-6). 
The buyer made no further payments and in 1984 Notice of 
Default was served. The default was not corrected, and in due 
course the aforesaid Quit-claim Deed was delivered by the escrow 
agent to defendant Malnar, who recorded the same February 3, 1984. 
(Ex. 10, T. 77) 
Prior thereto, on October 18, 1982, Deseret Transmission 
had commenced a condemnation action seeking to condemn a right-of-
way across the 76-acre tract for a high-tension power line. (Ex. 
35) 
On February 9, 1984, Eastern Utah Resources executed a 
Notice of Interest against the entire 76 acres of the property, 
which was recorded February 14, 1984. The said Notice of Interest 
referred to an Assignment of Contract dated February 25, 1983, 
wherein it stated that Ferron Elder had assigned to Eastern Utah 
Resources all of his right, title and interest in and to the 
aforesaid Real Estate Contract made and entered into between 
Marvel Malnar as seller and Ferron Elder as buyer. The said 
Notice of Interest as of the time of trial had not been released. 
(Ex. 24) Clark Jenkins, one of the partners of Eastern Utah 
Resources, testified that Eastern Utah Resources recorded the 
said Notice of Interest after they learned that Mrs. Malnar had 
undertaken action by reason of their default in the following 
language: 
"Q Is that why you recorded a Notice of Interest 
shortly after the default by Mrs. Malnar on the subject 
property? Do you know what I am referring to? 
"A Yes. You're right. When we found out that the six 
acres had gone back or we were defaulted, we were going 
to put a Notice of Interest because we felt we still had 
a claim on the property there. 
"Q You still claimed an interest in that property? 
"A Yes. 
"Q The whole 76-acre piece of property? Is that 
correct? 
"A Yes." (T. 112) (Emphasis added.) 
It was developed at trial that Eastern Utah Resources 
was a partnership consisting of Ferron Elder and the four buyers 
under the Contract of December 31, 1980, Jenkins, McCarver, Mabey 
and Johnson, together with four other persons, including one 
Darrell Didericksen. (T. 54-5) 
On February 5, 1985, Ferron Elder conveyed the six 
acres referred to in the Warranty Deed which had been recorded 
by mistake on December 19, 1980, to the said Didericksen, and 
that Deed was recorded April 17, 1985. (Ex. 23, T. 50) Thereafter 
Didericksen mortgaged the said six acres to Citizen's Bank for 
$321,000 by Trust Deed dated January 17, 1985, and recorded 
April 17, 1985. (Ex. 55) 
On March 7, 1985, (over one year after the aforesaid 
default) a Stipulation was entered into in the condemndation 
action by the defendant and Elder, Jenkins, McCarver, Mabey and 
Johnson wherein it was stipulated as follows: 
(1) That defendant Malnar was owner of all of the 76 
acres, including the six acres. (Defendant was not then aware 
that the deed to the six acres had been delivered to Elder at 
closing, nor of course that he had executed a deed thereto to 
Didericksen the month before) (T. 242); 
(2) That Malnar was to receive all condemnation 
proceeds; and 
(3) That plaintiffs retained the right to assert a 
claim to equitable restitution of the monies forfeited under the 
Real Estate Contract of December 19, 1980. (Ex. 26) 
Elder, Jenkins, McCarver, Mabey and Johnson commenced 
the present action in the District Court, of Duchesne County for 
alleged equitable restitution (R. 16), and on January 30, 1987, 
assigned all of their interest in said lawsuit to the current 
plaintiffs, Arvin L. Bellon, Maurine G. Bellon, B. Curtis Dastrup, 
Lanis B. Dastrup, and A. Labrum & Sons. (Ex. 19) 
The aforesaid condemnation action was tried to the 
Court in Duchesne County and resulted in the taking by Deseret 
Transmission of 5.21 acres (out of the said 76 acres) for its high-
tension power line which extended across the said 76 acres, and 
defendant Malnar received compensation for the taking of that 5.21 
acres in the total amount of $41,075. Of this sum $9,075 was paid 
to defendant Malnar in 1985, approximately one year after the Quit-
claim Deed to the 76 acres was recorded, and $32,000 was paid to 
her in 1986, approximately two years after the recording of said 
Quit-claim Deed returning the property to her. (Ex's 16, 17, 26, 
34; T. 102-3, 64-5, 69, 113-15) 
Defendant Malnar was required to expend $6,000 for 
attorney's fees in prosecuting the condemnation action, so that 
her net recovery for the taking of the 5.21 acres by Deseret 
Transmission, after payment of fees and expenses, in the 
condemnation action was $35,075. (Ex's 48, 50; T. 243-5) 
As of the time of the recording of the said Quit-claim 
Deed on February 3, 1984, an additional year's interest in the 
amount of $10,247.80 had accrued and never was paid. 
Prior to the recording of the Quit-claim Deed, real 
estate taxes and water assessments had accrued in the amount of 
$2,161.72, which buyers had failed to pay. (Ex. 20, Ex. 57) 
The value of the land at the time of the recording of 
the Quit-claim Deed back to Mrs. Malnar was disputed. Witnesses 
for the plaintiffs testified that the entire 76 acres was worth 
$180,000, including the 5.21 acres taken in the condemnation. 
(T. 168) Defendant's witnesses testified that the said tract, not 
including the 5.21 acres taken in the condemnation, was worth $700 
to $800 per acre, but no more than $101,000, the balance due at 
default. (T. 261-2) Defendant's appraiser stated the value in 
1985 (the time of the execution of the aforesaid stipulation, 
Exhibit 26) was $1,400 per acre ($90,000 for 70 acres) and had 
decreased steadily to the time of trial due to severe economic 
decline in Duchesne County. (T. 340, 343) 
The case was tried to the judge without a jury, being an 
equity case, and at the conclusion of the trial the Court directed 
that the parties make their closing arguments by memoranda, which 
were duly submitted by the parties. (R. 48-127) The Court then 
rendered a Memorandum Decision (R. 163-9) dated April 7, 1988, and 
entered April 20f 1988, in which the Court found the value of 
the land at the time of its return to Mrs. Malnar to be $180,000 
(R. 166), and found, based upon a "mutual mistake" theory that 
the six acres at the time of the closing should have been removed 
from the Contract and that it was therefore not properly included 
in the Quit-claim Deed recorded by Mrs. Malnar on February 3, 
1984, and found that said six acres was worth $30,000, and 
therefore found that the balance of the land returned to Mrs. 
Malnar, including the 5.21 acres taken in the condemnation action 
was worth $150,000 ($180,000 less $30,000). The Court quieted 
title to said six acres in plaintiffs. The Court did not explain 
why it refused to honor the stipulation of the parties of March 7, 
1985, where plaintiffs' predecessors declared that defendant owned 
all of the 76 acres (including this 6-acre tract). (R. 166-7) 
The Court declined to follow the rulings of the Supreme 
Court in the case of Perkins v. Spencer, supra, and the numerous 
Utah cases following it, but rather devised its own original 
damage formula. The Court rationalized that the balance owing on 
the Contract at the time the Quit-claim Deed back to defendant 
Malnar was recorded was $101,919.35, $50,080.65 having been paid 
on principal. The Court then concluded that the buyers owed an 
additional year's interest to the seller at that time amounting to 
$"107 3 91.95, together with $1,774.52 in unpaid real property taxes 
and water assessments, and therefore concluded that at the time 
Mrs. Malnar received the property back from escrow, the buyers 
owed her $113,885.82. (R. 168) 
The Court then determined that the net amount received 
by Mrs. Malnar from the condemnation of $35,075 ($41,075 less 
attorney's fees of $6,000) should be applied against that balance, 
as a payment on the Contract, notwithstanding $9,075 of said sum 
was not received until a year after the Quit-claim Deed was 
recorded, and the balance of $32,000 not received until two years 
thereafter. The Court then determined as noted above that the 
value of the land which defendant received back was $150,000 and 
concluded that Mrs. Malnar had therefore received $185,075 to 
apply on the balance owing at the time the Quit-claim Deed was 
returned to her, ($150,000 in land and $35,075 in condemnation 
proceeds), and that she therefore had received an overpayment of 
$71,189.18 (the $185,075 minus the balance of $113,885.22) and 
awarded judgment to plaintiffs in said sum of $71,189.18 as 
damages sustained by plaintiffs. (R. 168) 
For the convenience of the court, we submit herewith a 
summary of principal transactions with references to the exhibits 
and a diagram showing those transactions. 
SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL TRANSACTIONS 
Ex P5 Dec. 19, 1980 Real Estate Contract (76 acres) 
Malnar to Elder 
Ex Pll Dec. 19, 1980 Warranty Deed to 6 acres 
Recorded December 29, 1980 
Ex D22 Dec. 19, 1980 Notice of Interest of Malnar-Elder 
Contract, Recorded December 29, 1980 
Ex P9 Dec. 31, 1980 Real Estate Contract (76 acres) Elder 
to Jenkins, McCarver, Mabey, Johnson 
Ex P40 Jan. 6, 1981 Notice of Interest to Elder-Jenkins 
Contract (not recorded) 
Ex P35 Oct. 18, 1982 Date of Condemnation 
Ex D24 Feb. 25, 1983 Assignment by Elder to Eastern 
Utah Resources—all his interest 
in Malnar-Elder Contract; 
Ex P10 Feb. 3, 1984 Quit-Claim Deed in escrow, Ferron to 
Malnar of 76 acres returned to Malnar 
and recorded 
Feb. 9, 1984 Notice of Interest, Eastern Utah Resources 
Recorded February 14, 1984 
Feb. 5, 1985 Warranty Deed, Elder to Didericksen 
Recorded April 17, 1985 (6 acres) 
Jan. 17, 1985 Trust Deed, Didericksen to Citizen's Bank, 
6 acres, $321,000. (Recorded Apr 17, 1985) 
Mar. 7, 1985 Stipulation, Malnar—Elder, Jenkins, 
McCarver, Mabey & Johnson, as follows: 
1. Malnar owns all of 76 acres; 
2. Malnar to receive all condemnation 
proceeds; 
3. Plaintiffs retain right to assert 
claim for restitution of forfeited sums. 
Ex P19 Jan. 30, 1987 Assignment of current lawsuit from Elder, 
Jenkins, McCarver, Mabey, Johnson to Arvin 
L. Bellon, Maurine G. Bellon, B. Curtis 
Dastrup, Lanis B. Dastrup, A.Labrum & Sons 
Ex D24 
& 54 
Ex 
Ex 
Ex 
D23 
D55 
D26 
The principal transactions are diagramed as follows: 
Malnar 
Warranty Deed 
6 acres 
12-19-80 
R. 12-29-80 
1980 
¥ V 
Elder 
1983 2-25-83 
R.E. Contract #1 
76 acres 
12-19-80 
R.E. Contract #2 
^Elder ^ Jenkins 
12-31-80 McCarver 
Mabey 
Johnson 
(Ten in Common) 
Assignment of buyers interest 
in R.E. Contract #1 
Eastern Utah Resources Partnership 
2-9-84 J Notice of Interest 
(R.2-14-84) V 
To Whom It May Concern 
(Never been released of record) 
Malnar 
1984 n 
12-19-80 'N Q-C Deed 
R.2-3-84 76 acres 
-* Elder 
^Elder 
1985 
W. Deed 
2-5-85 
R.2-17-85 
6 acres 
Didericksen 
1987 
2-17-87 
Jenkins 
McCarver 
Mabey 
Johnson 
I 
3-7-85 Stip. that 
Malnar owns 
all 76 acres 
Malnar 
Trust Deed 
$321,000 
Citizens Bank 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Point I. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES CLAUSE IN THE REAL ESTATE 
CONTRACT IN QUESTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN ENFORCED BY THE COURT. 
A liquidated damages clause is normally enforceable and 
is unenforceable only if enforcement would allow an unconscionable 
and exhorbitant recovery bearing no reasonable relationship to 
actual damages. This requires a comparison of the liquidated 
damages with actual damages, and such a comparison in this case 
shows that actual damages are far in excess of liquidated damages. 
Therefore, the liquidated damages clause should have been enforced 
by the lower Court. 
Point II. THE COURT ERRED IN ANY EVENT IN DETERMINING 
DAMAGES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DOCTRINES OF PERKINS V. SPENCER AND 
SUBSEQUENT UTAH CASES APPLYING THE SAME. 
Instead of determining damages resulting to seller 
through: (1) loss of advantageous bargain; (2) damage or 
depreciation to the property; (3) any decline in value due to 
change in market value of property not allowed in the foregoing 
two items; and (4) for fair rental or interest accruing during the 
period of occupancy (there were no improvements to the property 
for which it would be fair to allow buyers any recovery) the Court 
developed a damage theory of its own in which it determined the 
value of the property forfeited at the time of forfeiture and 
considered the return of the property to the seller as a payment 
by the buyers and also considered moneys received by the seller 
through eminent domain as to 5.21 acres of the property (said sums 
having been received one and two years respectively after 
forfeiture) as payments in effect on the property and charged 
those to the seller. The Court then found that defendant seller 
had been overpaid and reimbursed buyers for the difference. Such 
treatment is not only not authorized by Perkins v. Spencer, but is 
contrary to this court's ruling in Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P2d 
1244 (Utah 1987), and in effect requires a seller forfeiting the 
buyer to "repurchase" the property from the buyer at present value 
and effectively destroys the real estate contract and forfeiture 
as a selling mechanism in Utah. The Court's holding also 
erroneously holds in effect that payments can be made on a 
forfeited contract long after the contract has been forfeited. 
POINT III. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO RETURN OF THE 
SIX-ACRE TRACT. 
Paragraph 17 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract (Ex. 5) 
provided that acreage could be released from the contract prior to 
payment in full thereof upon payments of $3,000 per acre over and 
above the regular payments made on the contract. No such payments 
were made. Nevertheless, the Court erroneously quieted title in 
plaintiffs to six acres. Although the buyers have seriously 
encumbered the property, the ownership thereof should have 
been quieted in defendant. 
POINT IV. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE VALUE OF 
THE PROPERTY TO BE $180,000, RATHER THAN $98,000. 
Although increase in value is irrelevant under Butler 
v. Wilkinson, supra, defendant points out that the Court erred in 
finding the value of the property to be $180,000, rather than 
$98f000 for the following reasons: (1) The evidence overwhelmingly 
showed that Duchesne suffered a severe economic reversal, that 
that was the reason (together with the presence of a high-tension 
wire which rendered the property unsuitable for residential 
purposes) why the plaintiffs gave up the property; (2) Had the 
property been worth $180,000, plaintiffs predecessors surely would 
have sold it, rather than let it be forfeited; (3) Plaintiffs1 
predecessors did not acquiesce in the forfeiture, but clouded the 
title and asserted ownership until March 7, 1985, and thus the 
valuation of the property should be determined at a date no sooner 
than March 7, 1985; (4) If subdivision was not feasible for 
plaintiffs1 predecessors, it certainly is not feasible for 
defendant; and (5) The only believable testimony as that that 
value was not more than $1,400 per acre or $98,000 total 
ARGUMENT 
The scope of review in this suit in equity for alleged 
unconscionable forfeiture is that the court will review the 
Findings and set them aside if they are clearly against the weight 
of the evidence or the lower Court has misapplied proven facts, 
Stanley v. Stanley, 97 Ut 520, 94 P2d 465 (1939), and it is 
established that this court should review and correct any inequity 
and unjust award by the lower Court. Hendricks v. Hendricks, 
91 Ut 553, 63 P2d 277. 
The principal findings assigned as error by the 
defendant are Findings Nos. 18f 24, 25 and 26. These findings are 
assigned as error on the basis that they are clearly against the 
weight of the evidence, that they constitute a misapplication of 
facts that were established at the trial, and the decision of the 
Court based upon the same is wholly inequitable and unjust, and 
these errors are discussed in Point I and Point II. 
Numerous other errors in the findings and decision of 
the Court were presented to the lower Court for its consideration 
in an instrument entitled Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Request for Oral Argument 
found in the record at pages 171 to 197, and the main errors in 
these other areas are preserved and identified in the following 
argurment. All such assignments of error are based upon the 
defendant's assertion that such findings are contrary to the 
weight of authority and misapply proven facts. If defendant is 
correct in her assignments of error as to the Findings, then of 
course the Conclusions of Law and Judgment of the Court stand 
unsupported and must be reversed. 
POINT I. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ENFORCE THE 
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES CLAUSE OF THE REAL ESTATE CONTRACT. 
In Perkins, supra, the court held at page 475: 
"On the contrary, where enforcement of the 
forfeiture provision would allow an unconscionable and 
exorbitant recovery, bearing no reasonable relationship 
to the actual damage suffered, we have uniformly held it 
to be unenforceable." 
In other words, if the amount forfeited (the 
total amount paid by the buyer on the contract) is greatly 
disproportionate to the actual damages suffered by the seller, the 
forfeiture provision will not be enforced. At page 476 of Perkins 
v. Spencer the court sets forth the factors for determining the 
actual damages as follows: 
"The vendors are entitled to any loss occasioned 
them by any of these factors: 
"(1) Loss of an advantageous bargain; 
"(2) Any damage to or depreciation of the 
property; 
"(3) Any decline in value due to change in market 
value of the property not allowed for in items nos. 1 
and 2; and 
"(4) For the fair rental value of the property 
during the period of occupancy. 
"The total of such sums should be deducted from the 
total amount paid in, plus any improvements for which it 
would be fair to allow recovery, and any remaining 
difference awarded to the plaintiffs." 
The holding in Spencer v. Perkins has been affirmed 
numerous times and is still the law in this state. See for 
example Warner v. Rasmussen, 704 P2d 562 (Utah 1985), Cole v. 
Parker, 5 Ut 2d 263, 300 P2d 623 (1956), and Jensen v. Nielsen, 
260 Ut 2d 96, 485 P2d 673 (1971). 
Indeed, in Jensen v. Nielsen, supra, the Supreme Court 
said in support of the use of a liquidated damages clause: 
"The forfeiture provision usually included in such real 
estate contracts has the entirely legitimate objectives: 
of putting pressure on the buyer to make his payments 
and keep the covenants of the contract; and the 
concomitant protection of the seller. This facilitates 
and encourages time-payment real estate transactions by 
enabling a purchaser to acquire property on such a 
contract; and it enables the sell.er to cooperate in that 
purpose by assuring him that through proper procedure he 
can reclaim his property in case the buyer fails to 
perform, 
"If at any time this happens the law would require 
an accounting as advocated by the plaintiffs, the 
advantages above mentioned would be lost. Furthermore, 
inasmuch as in the event trouble develops the court 
would take over and fashion another contract for the 
parties anyway, the right of contract would be seriously 
impaired. Consequently there would be little point in 
the parties giving much concern to negotiating their 
contract in the first place. But the law does not do 
this. Even if it be true that in some exigencies the 
courts refuse to enforce such forfeitures, before this 
is done, there is an essential predicate which first 
must be found to exist: the circumstances must be such 
that if the forfeiture were applied, it would be so 
grossly excessive in relation to any realistic view of 
loss that might have been contemplated by the parties, 
that it would so shock the conscience that a court of 
equity would refuse to enforce such forfeiture." 
Therefore, in determining whether or not the liquidated 
damages clause is to be enforced, it is necessary to determine 
seller's actual damages under Spencer v. Perkins, which we set 
forth as follows: 
LOSS OF ADVANTAGEOUS BARGAIN, 
The first inquiry is to whether there has been a loss 
of an advantageous bargain. This involves a determination as to 
whether or not the value of the land returned to the seller is 
less than the contract balance at the time of forfeiture or at 
such later time as is equitable. The original contract price was 
$152,000; the amount paid on principal was $50,080.46, leaving a 
contract balance of $101,919.54. Defendant's witnesses testified 
that the value of the property returned to the defendant did not 
exceed $98,000, which, if believed, would yield a loss of bargain 
to the defendant of $3,919.54. Plaintiffs1 witnesses testified 
that the value of the land returned was $180,000. The lower court 
determined that the defendant was not entitled to the return of 
the six acres, which the Court valued at $30,000, and therefore 
reduced the $180,000 figure to $150,000. Plaintiffs are not 
entitled to credit for any increase in the value fo the property 
at the time of forfeiture, if indeed there were any increase in 
value, and therefore defendant's loss of advantageous bargain is 
either $3,919.54 if defendant's witnesses are believed, or zero 
if plaintiffs' witnesses are believed. 
No one disputes that had the plaintiffs' predecessors 
fully performed their contract, they would have been entitled to a 
conveyance of the property and to the benefit of any increase in 
value. See Utah State Medical Association v. Utah State Employees 
Credit Union, 655 P2d 643 (Utah 1982). If the purchaser, however, 
does not perform and his interest is forfeited, then the purchaser 
loses the benefit of any appreciated value of the property over 
the contract price. This court specifically so held in Butler v. 
Wilkinson, supra, where the court stated at page 1256: 
"A vendee, however, is entitled to the appreciated 
value of the property over the contract purchase price 
as long as his or her interest has not been forfeited." 
(Emphasis added.) 
The court stated at page 1257 of the opinion: 
"Since the sales price to the Christensens exceeded 
the value of the Wilkinsons1 vendors1 security interest 
by $186/300, that amount was the value of Themy's equity 
interest subject to the judgment creditors1 liens, if 
Themy's property interest was not terminated." 
In that case the court held that the seller's forfeiture 
was not bona fide and held that, had the seller retained the 
property, liens would have attached. The court found, however, 
that the property had been purchased from the seller by a third 
party who purchased in good faith and without notice, and 
therefore held that the liens of judgment creditors were 
unenforceable in any event. 
In the instant case the forfeiture is not disputed, and 
in fact is insisted upon by the buyers, and the lower Court found 
a forfeiture (see paragraphs 10, 15 and 26 of the Findings) It is 
therefore clear that under the Butler case the plaintiffs were not 
entitled to be credited with the increased value of the property, 
if any. 
There has been no Utah case, nor any case whatever, 
so far as defendant is aware, where the defaulting buyer has 
been awarded the value of the -land forfeited in excess of the 
balance owing. In several Utah cases the value of the land 
returned exceeded the contract value, but that did not entitle the 
buyer to reimbursement in said amount, but merely indicated that 
there was no damage to the seller by reason of loss in market 
value. For example, in Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P2d 1082 (Utah 1983) at 
page 1085 we read: 
"The plaintiff produced no evidence that the 
property had diminished in value. Mr. Ridd, one of the 
buyers, testified that when he and his wife vacated the 
property was worth a substantial amount more than the 
contract price of $57,500." 
If a seller is liable to a forfeited buyer for the 
excess of the value of land over the purchase price, then a buyer 
in a market where prices are rising can immediately default 
without making any further payments, and the forfeiting seller 
will have to reimburse the buyer for the value of. the land in 
excess of the purchase price. We respectfully submit that that 
has never been the law. 
In Warner v. Rasmussen, supra, the buyer sought recovery 
of the value of improvements made to the property. Perkins v. 
Spencer does suggest that in a proper case the cost (not value) of 
improvements to the property might be reimbursable to the buyer. 
In Warner the buyer argued that the value of the property had not 
diminished during buyer's occupancy and that therefore he was 
entitled to reimbursement for the improvements. The Supreme Court 
affirmed the finding of the lower court that even with the improve-
ments the value of the property did not exceed the contract price. 
In Kay v. Wood, 549 P2d 709 (Utah 1976), the lower court 
found that the buyer had made improvements to the property in the 
amount of $5,802.30, that the property was worth $7,000 more at 
forfeiture than the contract price and allowed the buyer damages 
against the seller in the sum of $4,663.05. The Supreme Court 
affirmed on the basis that no transcript had been provided, 
declining to look behind the findings in such a case. The Supreme 
Court said that without a transcript "we cannot determine whether 
or not it was error for the court below to conclude that it was 
unconscionable for the plaintiff to retain all of the payments and 
the value of the improvements made." (Emphasis added.) The case 
would thus not seem to be much support for any proposition, but at 
most would only support the view that the cost (not value) of 
improvements in a proper case may be reimbursed to buyer to the 
extent that the value of the land at forfeiture exceeds the 
contract price. 
In the instant case there were no improvements to the 
property, and thus plaintiffs were entitled to no reimbursement 
even if the value of the land had in fact increased over the 
original purchase price. 
DAMAGE TO OR DEPRECIATION OF THE PROPERTY 
The next point to consider is whether there has been any 
damage to, or depreciation of, the property. It is undisputed 
that the six-acre tract has never been returned to the defendant. 
The lower Court held that the plaintiffs were not 
required to return the six acres, quieted title to the said six 
acres in plaintiffs, found that said property was worth $30,000 
and allowed defendant credit for that $30,000. Defendant does not 
quarrel with the fact that she is at least entitled to credit for 
the said $30,000, but does claim that the Court erred in quieting 
title therein in plaintiffs. The matter of the return of the said 
six acres is discussed in Point III hereafter. 
Also, that land was damaged in connection with the 
eminent domain proceedings, part of which was not reimbursed to 
defendant, and she is entitled to be credited with that sum here, 
to-wit, $6,000 attorneys' fees she was required to pay her 
attorneys in the eminent domain action. 
As noted above, defendant, upon forfeiture, was entitled 
to return, of all of the land before there could be any possibility 
of any reimbursement to plaintiffs. Since a portion of the 76 
acres (5.21 acres) was taken by condemnation, defendant was 
obviously entitled to the condemnation proceeds to take the place 
of the lost land. As those condemnation proceeds to defendant 
were reduced by the amount of the attorneys' fees defendant had to 
pay to get them, she is entitled to reimbursement for those fees. 
If plaintiffs' predecessors had not defaulted, they would have had 
to pay the attorneys' fees from the land taken from them, but 
would still have had to pay defendant the full agreed purchase 
price. When they defaulted, as between plaintiffs' predecessors 
and defendant, plaintiffs' predecessors had the duty to return all 
of the land without any deduction therefrom for attorney's fees, 
and thus defendant was entitled to the condemnation proceeds 
without any deduction threfrom for attorneys' fees. Having paid 
the $6,000 from said proceeds, it is an element of damages to her. 
Plaintiffs' predecessors had done some planning for a 
subdivision (which was the purpose for which they intended to use 
the property). Some earth work had been done, but there was no 
cement work, paving or structures erected on the land. The 
potential for a subdivision evaporated with the economic reversal 
in Duchesne County. Defendant testified that the only use for the 
land was agrcultural and that it would cost $30,000 to restore the 
property to agricultural use. (T. 253-4, 368) Defendant has thus 
been damaged $30,000 in necessary restoration fees. Cost of 
restoration was approved as a proper element of damage in 
Johnson v. Carman, 572 P2d 371 (Utah 1977). 
DECLINE IN VALUE DUE TO CHANGE IN MARKET VALUE NOT 
ALLOWED FOR IN THE FOREGOING ELEMENTS OF DAMAGE. 
There would appear to be no decline in value due to 
change in market value not allowed for in the preceding items. 
INTEREST OR FAIR RENTAL VALUE. 
This brings us to the fair rental value of the property 
or interest during the period of occupancy. Although Perkins v. 
Spencer talks in terms of rental value, subsequent Utah cases have 
approved the use of interest as an appropriate measure of damage 
for use of the premises, and this is the measure used by the lower 
Court. See Biesinqer v. Behunin, 584 P2d 801 (Utah 1978), and 
Jacobsen v. Swan, 3 Ut 2d 59, 278 P2d 294 (1954). 
Plaintiffs1 predecessors paid $26,059.90 interest, which 
the defendant was obviously entitled to retain, and an additional 
yearfs interest accrued from February 1983 to February 1984 in the 
amount of $10f247.80f which was never paid and which was allowed 
by the lower court as a credit to defendant. In addition, 
defendant contends that she was entitled to interest from February 
1984 when she asserted forfeiture until the Stipulation was signed 
on March 7, 1985, (Ex. 26) because until that date plaintiffs' 
predecessors contested the forfeiture and clouded the title with 
their Notice of Interest recorded February 14, 1984. The amount 
of interest from February 1984 until March 7, 1985 would be 
$10,674.79. 
Case law supports the proposition that the seller should 
have a reasonable time after return of the property to repair and 
resell the property, and the seller should be allowed the recovery 
of interest for that time period. In the case of Cole v. Parker, 
supra, the Utah Supreme Court held that seller, as one element of 
damage, is entitled to an amount equal to the difference between 
the contract price and the price "for which he can sell the 
forfeited property." The Court said: 
"Thus, in the absence of a finding of fraud, the 
seller is entitled to be credited, in the computation of 
damage sustained because of the breach of the contract, 
the difference between the contract price and the price 
for which he can sell the forfeited property." 
This same wording is used in Park Valley Corp. v. 
Baqley, 635 P2d 65 (Utah 1981) at page 67. 
That implies a consideration of factors other than fair 
market value alone. It takes into consideration the practical 
problems faced by the seller as he attempts to dispose of the 
property he is forced to take back, and in addition to including a 
time element for resale, should take into consideration the state 
of the title as it relates to marketability. In this case the six 
acres is certainly not marketable, and the 70 acres was not 
marketable because of the Notice of Interest, at least until the 
Stipulation (Ex. 26), and in fact is not marketable to this date 
until the record interest of Eastern Utah Resources is terminated. 
In Jensen v. Nielsen, supra, the Supreme Court stated: 
"In addition to the foregoing, it is without 
dispute that the best offer for the property after plaint 
iffs1 occupancy was $5,000 less than plaintiffs had 
agreed to pay for it. Thus defendants were entitled to 
credit for that additional amount as loss of favorable 
bargain, or as diminution in value." 
It seems clear that before the court can grant 
equitable relief to a defaulting buyer, it must see that equity is 
administered to the seller as well. In administering equity the 
court is required to look to the realities and the essential 
fairness of the situation with respect to resale. 
In Carlson v. Carlson, 8 Ut 2d 272, 332 P2d 989 (1958), 
in pointing out that that case did not involve unconscionability 
within the requirements of Perkins v. Spencer, supra, the Supreme 
Court of Utah stated: 
"The amount of damages here was but 9i% of the purchase 
price, an amount that would exceed but little the real 
estate commission that would have to be paid on resale 
of the property that defendants took back without fault 
on their part, from those who caused all the difficulty 
by breaking the contract. 
"The two cases are poles apart, the one obviously 
being punctuated by unconscionability, the other 
appearing to call only for the exaction of a reasonably 
small percentage of the price for a breach that would 
cause delay for repairs, time lapse for re-sale, and 
possible other items of damage susceptible of little but 
conjectural measurement." (Emphasis added.) 
It appears cle^r that time lapse for repair and resale 
is a valid element of damages, and the court can and should allow 
at least one year in this case based upon the need for restoration 
time and expense coupled with the poor economic climate in 
Duchesne County. For such one-year time period the plaintiffs 
would owe additional interest of $10,247.80. 
Finally, defendant was required to pay taxes and water 
assessment which accrued before forfeiture, but were not paid by 
plaintiffs1 predecessors, in the sum of $1,521.52 taxes and $640 
water assessment. (Ex. 57 and Ex. 20) In Finding No. 19 the Court 
allowed a total of $1,774.52 for these items, but the correct 
amount is $2,161.72, and failure to allow the full amount is 
assigned as error and is apparently just an oversight. 
Total damages as discussed above are set forth in 
summary as follows: 
Loss of bargain $ 3,919.54* 
Damage to or depreciation 
to property 
Loss of six acres 30,000.00 
restoration cost to land 30,000.00 
Unreimbursed attorneys• 
fees, eminent domain 6,000.00 
Interest paid to 1-29-82 13f991.37 
Interest paid to 2-1-83 12,118.53 
Unpaid interest 
Feb. 1983 to Feb. 1984 10f247.80 
(to date of forfeiture) 
Feb. 1984 to Mar. 7, 1985 10,264.79 
(extra interest to date 
when plaintiffs' predecessors 
acknowledged forfeiture) 
Mar. 7 1985 to Mar. 7f 1986 10f247.80 
(interest during reasonable 
repair and resale period) 
Taxes and water assessments 2,161.72 
Total damages $128f951.55* 
(*Total damages would be $125,032.01 if plaintiffs witnesses 
were believed on the question of value ($128,951.55 less 
$3,919.54.) 
Total interest and principal paid 
by plaintiffs1 predecessors 76,240.36 
Excess of actual damages over 
liquidated damages $52,711.19 
It is thus clear that actual damages exceed liquidated 
damages by $52,711.19, and therefore the liquidated damages1 
provision should be enforced. 
POINT II. IN ANY EVENT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING 
TO DETERMINE DAMAGES UNDER THE DOCTRINE ANNOUNCED IN PERKINS V. 
SPENCER AND SUBSEQUENT UTAH CASES APPLYING THAT DOCTRINE. 
The trial Court in the instant case failed to follow the 
holding of Perkins v. Spencer in any case. The Court reasoned in 
its Memorandum Decision that the Court should determine the 
balance owing to the seller on the contract at the time of the 
default, and that the Court should apply against that balance as a 
payment thereon the value of the land being returned to the seller 
and also should apply against that balance as a payment thereon 
(Finding 18) the amount received by the seller over a year after 
forfeiture as compensation for the take in the eminent domain case 
and then award the "overpayment" to the buyer. This theory of 
damages (Judge Bunnell's own original theory) was Finding 25 and 
is manifest error. 
It appears that plaintiffs realized that the Court's 
analysis was in error and that it was totally at variance with 
Perkins and Spencer, so plaintiffs attempted to restructure the 
Court's figures so that they appeared to be in the form of Perkins 
v. Spencer, but that restructuring is wholly illusory and equally 
erroneous. This version of damages was included in the proposed 
Findings as Finding 24, and was objected to by defendant in the 
court below and here, but the objection below was summarily 
rejected by the Court without even allowing oral argument. This 
paragraph 24 version of damages purports to first determine the 
total amounts paid on the contract. It includes the principal 
paid of $50,130.46 and the interest paid of $26,059.90, but then 
adds to said sums the $35,075 paid in the eminent domain case as 
though it were a payment by buyer paid on the contract. As noted, 
the amount paid in the eminent domain case was paid over a year 
after the default, was not paid by the plaintiffs in any event, 
but rather by Deseret Transmission in the eminent domain case, and 
was paid as compensation for the taking of 5.21 acres of land, 
which has never been returned to the seller—and never will be-
-and represents land permanently taken. The eminent domain money 
stands in the place of the land defendant was entitled to receive 
back, and seller is not chargeable therewith any more than if she 
had received the land back. It is in no sense money paid by 
plaintiffs1 predecessors. This is the first major error in the 
paragraph 24 version of damages. 
The paragraph 24 version then goes on to purportedly 
determine the actual damages sustained by seller. It allows as 
damages the interest paid on the contract of $26,059.90 and allows 
an extra year of unpaid interest which accrued between February 1, 
1983, and February 3, 1984, of $10,247.80, and allows seller 
$1,774.52 for unpaid taxes and water assessments, but then comes 
another major error. The Court purports to allow defendant $2,000 
damages for loss of bargain by comparing the original purchase 
price of $152,000 with the finding that the land was worth 
$150,000 when it was returned to defendant. This presumably is 
based upon the Court's determination that the whole tract was 
worth $180,000 when it was returned to defendant, but that since 
the six-acre tract was not returned by buyer, the figure of 
$180,000 is reduced by $30,000 to reach the $150,000 figure. 
Such treatment is error. 
Under Perkins v. Spencer the seller is entitled to be 
credited with any loss resulting from "damage to or depreciation 
of the property." Since the six acres was not returned to seller, 
defendant is entitled to be credited with the $30,000 as a direct 
deduction from the $50,130.46 paid on the contract by buyer. In 
other words, if the buyer is not required to return the six acres, 
then $30f000 worth of the $50,130.46 paid on principal should be 
assigned to that six acres which was never returned, meaning that 
plaintiffs have only paid $20,130.46 on the remaining 70 acres. 
It is improper for the Court to deduct that $30,000 damaige item 
from an inflated valuation figure of $180,000, or any valuation 
figure, and then erroneously conclude that seller has received 
credit for failure to return the six acres in that manner. 
Perkins v. Spencer does not require seller to give credit to 
the buyer if the value of the land when returned has increased 
in value. If there has been an increase in the value of the land, 
it merely means that seller does not get credit for any actual 
damages for loss of bargain. As held by this court in Butler v. 
Wilkinson, supra, buyer on forfeiture loses the benefit of any 
increase in value. 
Perkins v. Spencer and Butler v. Wilkinson do not 
require the seller in effect to buy the property back from the 
buyer if the value of the land has increased. It is therefore 
manifest error for the Court to deny defendant credit for damages 
for the value of property never returned by deducting such value 
from the supposed increase in the value of the land. If the Court 
cannot directly charge the seller with the increased value of the 
land over the contract price (and thus require, in effect, that 
the seller buy the property back from the buyer at the increased 
value), the Court cannot indirectly do the same thing by deducting 
the seller's loss (accruing td seller from the six acres never 
returned) from the supposed increase in valuation in the land. 
The same is true of the $30,000 restoration cost. In effect, the 
trial Court is saying that he will not allow defendant any damages 
from the six acres which have never been returned to her or from 
the destruction to the land done by the bulldozer because the rest 
of the land that she got back is worth more than it was when she 
sold it. In other words, under this theory, the buyer can damage, 
destroy, or even sell off parcels of the land covered by the 
contract if the remnant returned to the seller has increased in 
value enough to offset the carnage. This would allow the buyer to 
burn down the improvements on property or physically remove them 
and sell them off with inpunity if the value of the land remaining 
was equal to the balance owing on the contract. 
By requiring the seller to pay the defaulting party the 
excess value of the land over the balance owing at default, the 
Court is requiring the seller to buy back the land from the buyers 
and rewarding the defaulting party because the buyers don't even 
have to go looking for a buyer or pay a commission. 
That theory is not the doctrine of Perkins v. Spencer 
and is directly contrary to Butler v. Wilkinson, and is error. 
For the convenience of the court we desire to summarize 
damages computed under Judge Bunnell's theory of damages and 
plaintiffs' attempted restructuring of this same erroneous theory 
for comparison with what we believe to be the correct computation 
of damages under Perkins v. Spencer as set out at the end of Point 
I. 
I. Judge Bunnell's theory of damages 
(Page 6 of Memorandum Decision and incorporated in 
substance as paragraph 25 of Findings of Fact) 
"The Court has reached the following factual analysis: 
Balance owing on Contract - $101f919.35 
Additional interest owing - 10,191.95 
to date of forfeiture 
Taxes and assessments paid - lf774.52 
Total due Malnar - 113,885.82 
Amount received by Malnar - 35f075.00 
from condemnation 
Value of land received - 150,000.00 
after forfeiture 
Total - 185f075.00 
Amount actually received - 185,075.00 
Amount of damage suffered - 113,885.82 
$ 71,189.18" 
II. Theory of damages included in the Findings as Finding No, 24 
by plaintiffs' counsel and adopted by the Court as an alternate 
theory of damages: 
Principal paid by Elder on contrct $ 50,130.46 
Interest paid by Elder on contract 26f059.50 
Eminent domain proceeds paid by 
Deseret Transmission 35f075.00 
Total 111,265.36 
Damages sustained by defendant 
Interest paid 26,059.90 
Interest accrued, but unpaid 10,247.60 
Unpaid taxes and water assessment 1,774.52 
Difference between contract price of 
$152,000 and value of property returned 2,000.00 
Total 40,082.22 
Difference awarded to plaintiffs $71,183.14 
The only real difference in the two calculations is 
that the first talks in terms of balance owing to the seller as 
seller's damage and purports to "overpay" this damage with the 
condemndation money and "increased" value of the land. The second 
calculation involves comparing amounts supposedly paid on the 
contract against seller's damages (which is the form of Perkins 
v. Spencer), but the same errors are perpetuated by considering 
condemnation money as a payment and by failing to show loss of 
the six acres as damages to the seller. 
It is important to note that even limiting our 
consideration to the items allowed by the lower Court, but 
correctly structuring them within the framework of Perkins v. 
Spencer, there is still no justification for failing to enforce 
the liquidated damages clause. We review the case in this light 
for the purpose of demonstrating that, even assuming for the sake 
of argument the correctness of that finding, the Court's analysis 
of damages is still wholly erroneous. 
Perkins v. Spencer (but using the lower Court's Findings only) 
Total principal paid on contract $50,130.46 
Total interest paid on contract 26,059.90 
Total 76,190.36 
Actual damages 
Loss of bargain -0- * 
Damage or depreciation to 
property (six acres) 30,000.00 
Decline in market value 
not allowed above -0-
Interest paid 26,059.90 
Interest accrued, but unpaid 10,247.80 
Unpaid taxes and water assessment 1,774.52 
Total 68,082.22 
Difference $ 8,108.14 
The difference between liquidated damages and actual 
damages is thus no more than $8,108.14 even using the lower 
Court's figures, which represents 5.3% of the total purchase 
price, and even this difference is not unconscionable. The 
Court stated in Biesinger v. Behunin, supra: 
"Adding these attorneys' fees to the rent figure of 
$18,900 we see that plaintiffs' actual damages are 
within $8,612 of that amount agreed upon by the parties 
as liquidated damages in the event of breach. We do not 
deem that amount to be unreasonable, unconscionable, or 
in the nature of a penalty, particularly in view of the 
fact that it represents only 9i% of the purchase price 
of $90,000.00. Consequently, we decline to alter the 
terms of the contract." 
Furthermore, the total of the eminent domain proceeds 
received by defendant was $41,075. Defendant had to speid $6,000 
for attorneys' fees to obtain that recovery. Even the trial Court 
acknowledged this when it charged defendant with receipt of 
$35,075, rather than $41,075. If this $6,000 is deducted from the 
figure of $8,108.14, it leaves a difference of only $2,108.14, 
which clearly is not an unconscionable difference. 
NO PAYMENT POSSIBLE ON TERMINATED CONTRACT 
The Court is treating the contract as though it were 
still alive, even after forfeiture. If the contract has been 
forfeited, it ceased to exist and is dead. No further payments 
can be made on it. To further compound the error the Court is 
treating the eminent domain proceeds as though they too were a 
payment on the contract, although the eminent domain proceeds were 
not received until long after the contract was forfeited and could 
in nowise be considered payment on the contract. [$9,075 was paid 
in 1985 (Ex. 26), a year after forfeiture, and $32,000 in 1986, 
two years after forfeiture. (Ex. 16)] 
Had this case come on for trial after forfeiture, but 
before condemnation proceeds were paid to the defendant, the Court 
would have been unable to grant plaintiffs credit for an eminent 
domain payment. It is obvious that the determination of 
plaintiffs1 rights have nothing to do with the payment of the 
condemnation money. The rights between the parties were fixed at 
the time of forfeiture and cannot be affected by what happens 
thereafter. Plaintiffs are not entitled to the benefit of a 
"generous" factfinder in the condemnation action, nor will they be 
penalized by a "conservative" one. Numerous cases have held that 
once the property is forfeited and returned to the seller, the 
buyer is not entitled to any credit for amounts which the seller 
thereafter receives from the property. See 77 Am Jur 2d, Vendor 
and Purchaser, Section 503, and annotation at 31 ALR 2d 8 at page 
128. See also Sanders v. Brock, 230 Penn 609, 79 A. 772 (1911). 
In Finding of Fact No. 9, which defendant assigns as 
error, the Court found that on January 30, 1987, plaintiffs1 
predecessors assigned to plaintiffs "all of their right, title and 
interest in and to the real estate contract with Malnar and the 
seventy-six (76) acres described therein." That finding 
demonstrates that the Court felt that as recently as 1987 the real 
estate contract was still alive as some interst in the land is 
still subject to being conveyed in the Court's mind. In fact, the 
assignment (Ex. 19) only purports to assign the "claims"made in 
this action. 
UTAH EMINENT DOMAIN LAW SUPPORTS DEFENDANT 
Under Utah law the buyer was entitled to the 
condemnation money as of the date of condemnation, subject to the 
seller's right to remain secured. See Jelco v. Third District 
Court, 29 Ut 2d 472, 511 P2d 739 (1973). Forfeiture of the land 
takes back all rights of the buyer, including that one. Even if 
buyer, before forfeiture, were willing to apply the condemnation 
money as a payment on the contract, he couldn't apply it until he 
got it. It was not paid to the defendant until 1985 and 1986, one 
and two years respectively after the contract was forfeited. 
If the lower Court is saying that the contract is 
somehow kept alive until a year or more after forfeiture so that 
the eminent domain money can be treated as a payment on the 
contract, then the contract by definition is alive after the 
forfeiture and there is no forfeiture. 
Eminent domain is meant to compensate for a taking or 
for a burden imposed upon property. While it is true that the 
eminent domain action was started before the forfeiture, that only 
means that the buyer (while he is still buyer) is entitled to any 
damage done to the land through eminent domain since the buyer 
will be the ultimate owner of the land which will continue to be 
burdened. Where, however, there is a forefeiture, it is then the 
seller who takes the land back, who is thus burdened by the use 
imposed through eminent domain, and therefore seller is entitled 
to the proceeds, and since the burden imposed is not a part of any 
purchase agreement, but is rather an "injury" to the land, so to 
speak, by a third party, the proceeds of eminent domain cannot be 
considered in any sense as purchase price, and this is true, not 
only because it is the seller who gets the burdened land back, 
rather than the buyer, but also because the forfeited buyer is not 
returning the entire tract whole. He is not returning everything 
he purchased. He is returning "damaged goods," and he isn't 
entitled to full credit for the land returned because it is 
damaged. It is axiomatic that the seller must receive back what 
he sold before he is required to refund anything to the seller. 
Any violation of that axiom would seem to be violation of due 
process. 
In the eminent domain action Judge Davidson awarded 
compensation for the 5.21 acres taken, he also awarded a severance 
damage reflecting damage done to the remaining acreage, all of 
which is now, and for so long as she owns it, a burden upon the 
defendant, Mrs. Malnar. It is also a burden which will be passed 
on to future buyers and will negatively effect the purchase price 
as compared to land not so burdened. This severance damage was 
based upon the theory of cost to cure and is an expense Mrs. 
Malnar must go to in order tof in effect, rehabilitate her landf 
and can't be construed as part of any purchase price to defendant. 
The eminent domain proceeds stand in the place of the land taken 
or destroyed. They rightfully belong to whomever the land should 
have been returned to. If this money had been paid to the buyer 
before forfeiture, then it would have belonged to the buyer 
(subject to the requirement that the seller be properly secured), 
and the buyer could presumably have elected to use it to make a 
payment on the contract, and under Perkins v. Spencer that payment 
would be reflected as a payment made by the buyer, but would 
likewise be reflected as damage to the property as seller would be 
getting back less than he sold, whereas on forfeiture he should 
get the land back in its original condition. In effect there 
would be a "wash" as the extra payment would be offset by the 
damage to the property. This is as it should be as the seller 
in that event would have been paid with his own land, and buyer 
should have no credit for that. 
If the money had been paid to the buyer before 
forfeiture and buyer did not apply it on the contract, then under 
Perkins v. Spencer buyer will not be credited with a payment, but 
^ M 1
 j be charged with damage to the land (since seller is not 
getting back what she sold) and this will be reflected in a 
judgment for loss of bargain for seller. These computations are 
not necessarily mathematically exact as there may be other factors 
involved, but are at least illustrative. 
In any event, after forfeiture, buyer would have no 
right to the condemnation money as Buyer is no longer owner of the 
property. Furthermore, by virtue of the Stipulation (Ex. 26), the 
parties agreed that the condemnation proceeds would be the sole 
property of the defendant. When the Court gives the plaintiffs 
credit for the eminent domain proceeds in its computations, the 
Court is rewriting the 1985 Stipulation. 
POINT III. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO RETURN OF THE 
SIX-ACRE TRACT. 
In Findings of Fact Nos. 20, 21 and 22 the Court found 
that plaintiffs were entitled to the six acres, and those findings 
are assigned as error. 
The Real Estate Contract provides in paragraph 17: 
"Upon payment of the sum of $3,000 in addition to 
the annual payments herein required, Seller agrees to 
release one-acre lots. The releases will be upon 
approval to Bull Valley Resources of Denver, Colorado. 
Buyer shall receive credit for all sums paid for lot 
releases on the last payments to become due. It is not 
intended that said $3,000 per acre should be extra 
consideration, but merely early payment for early 
release of the lot." (Emphasis added.) 
It is therefore clear that the parties agreed that if 
buyer made extra payment over and above the specified annual 
payments, he would receive a release of acreage at the rate of 
$3,000 per acre. It is undisputed that no extra payments were 
made, and defendant was therefore never entitled to release of 
any acreage. It is thus clear that the deed to the six acres 
was to have been held in escrow until paid for, but that it was 
erroneously recorded by the escrow agent shortly after closing. 
It should further be noted that at the time the 
Stipulation was entered into (Ex. 26), the parties agreed in 
paragraph 1 thereof: 
"that Marvel Malnar is the record owner of that certain 
real property involved in the above-entitled action to 
which the aforenamed defendants are parties, the real 
property being more particularly described as . . . " 
The legal description is then set forth, and it includes the six-
acre tract. It is thus clear that the parties never intended any 
release of acreage until additional consideration was paid, and as 
it never was paid, the parties agreed that defendant was entitled 
to return of the six acres. Although requested, the Court refused 
to find that the Stipulation of March 7, 1985, confirmed title to 
the six acres in defendant, and such failure is also assigned as 
error. (R. 189) 
In fact, several weeks before the Stipulation was 
signed, plaintiffs1 predecessor, Ferrin Elder, deeded the six-acre 
tract to Didericksen, who in turn encumbered it with the bank for 
a loan in excess of $300,000. It is therefore clear that the six 
acres has not been returned intact and that it has been damaged or 
depreciated significantly. 
It was testified that at least $5,000 would have to be 
expended in attorney's fees to conduct a quiet-title action with 
respect to said six acres. In view of the depressed market 
conditions in Duchesne, it is questionable that the value of the 
six acres, if it can be obtained, would at the present time exceed 
the $5,000 attorney's fees by very much. The lower court held 
that the six acres was not subject to return to the defendant, and 
the trial court quieted title thereto in the plaintiffs and fixed 
its value at $30,000. 
One thing is clear, and that is that the six acres has 
been virtually totally destroyed, and plaintiffs are chargeable 
therewith. Either the land has been deeded away, and is gone, or 
is severely encumbered, and the cost to defendant will be very 
nearly its actual value in the depressed market of Duchesne 
County. Still it is clear that it was not to have been released, 
and the Court should award it to defendant for whatever she may be 
able to hereafter do with it. 
The original deed placed in escrow covered the entire 76 
acres and thus included the six-acre tract. This clearly shows 
that the six acres was not intended to be released at that time. 
There is no basis for a finding of mutual mistake in those facts. 
There is no showing in the evidence that defendant ever agreed to 
release the six acres without compensation, nor that she agreed to 
an escrowed deed from buyer for less than 76 acres. Until she was 
paid for the extra six acres, it was as subject to forfeiture as 
was the rest of the tract. Had buyer paid for tire si^ acres, than 
at the time of the release of the six acres, the Quit-claim Deed 
could and would have been corrected. This never happened as the 
six acres was never paid for. The only mistake was that the deed 
was prematurely and erroneously recorded. 
An effort was made to get defendant to agree to a 
release of six acres without extra consideration prior to closing 
and a modifying Earnest Money Agreement with such provision was 
prepared dated December 18, 1980, but rejected by the defendant. 
(Ex. 4; T. 283) 
At closing the next day it was apparently signed at 
the same time as the Real Estate Contract (Ex. 5), but defendant 
testified she did not know she had signed it. It was placed in 
front of her and she thought it was just another closing document. 
The Real Estate Contract expressed her intent. (T. 283) By its 
own terms (line 43) the Earnest Money was abrogated by execution 
of the final Real Estate Contract. The final contract also varied 
from the "Earnest Money" in payment terms. 
The lower Court in Findings of Fact Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 
6 purported to find that the earnest money was entered into on 
December 18, 1980f and led up to the final contract, but those 
findings are also assigned as error by defendant. The undisputed 
testimony was that the document was not signed until December 19, 
1980, and although the date line by defendant's signature is 
blank, the document is dated the 19th in the botton "receipt" 
section. 
POINT IV. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE VALUE OF THE 
PROPERTY TO BE $180,000, RATHER THAN $98,000. 
In Finding No. 17 the Court found the 76 acres to have 
a fair market value of $180,000 at default in February 1984f and 
that finding is assigned as error. 
The value of the land is irrelevant unless it is less 
than the. contract price so that the seller can show that he has 
suffered a loss of bargain. As heretofore pointed out, if the 
value of the land happens to increase during the pendency of the 
contract, buyer is not entitled to the benefit of that increase 
where the property is forfeited. See Butler v. Wilkinsen, supra. 
Accordingly, any increase in the value of the land is irrelevant. 
If the Court, however, should find any other relevance to an 
increase in the value of the property, defendant desires to point 
out that the Court erred in finding the property to be worth 
$180,000 in the first place. 
This being an equity case, this court on appeal can make 
its own findings of fact as to value. We respectfully submit that 
the evidence and particularly the following facts compel a finding 
that the property was not worth more than $98,000: 
1. The evidence overwhelmingly shows that Duchesne 
County suffered a severe economic reversal, and in fact that is 
the reason that the sellers decided not to proceed with the 
purchase. Hrd the price of the land in reality gone up, buyers 
would have held on to the same and sold it at a profit. The very 
fact that they let it go to forfeiture when they had the economic 
ability to make payments shows that the property had severely 
decreased in value. 
2. Plaintiffs1 predecessors refused to acquiesce in 
the forfeiture, filed a Notice of Interest against the property, 
and claimed ownership thereof until March 7, 1985, the correct 
time for determining value is no sooner than March 7, 1985. 
Plaintiffs submitted no testimony as to the value at that time 
and failed to sustain their burden of proof. 
3. The property is still burdened with a Notice of 
Interest in favor of Eastern Utah Resources Partnership, which 
plaintiffs1 witnesses failed to take into consideration in 
arriving at their value of $180,000, and said value unquestionably 
constitutes an encumbrance against the property. The burden of 
proof for showing that actual damages are less than liquidated 
damages is upon the party so asserting, in this case the 
plaintiffs, and they have failed to so show. 
4. In attempting to establish a higher value for the 
property plaintiffs contended that the property was still able to 
be subdivided, but contended that it was not economically feasible 
for them to do so. Plaintiffs did not explain, nor did the Court 
make any finding, as to how it would be economically feasible for 
defendant to subdivide the property when it wasn't so for the 
plaintiffs. Defendant and her experts testified that the property 
has reverted in feasibility to an agricultural use only. 
Defendant testified that as of trial she had filed for Green Belt 
and made application for federal participation in an irrigation 
system. (T. 253-4) Defendant's cost for putting in such a system 
as indicated by both the defendant's husband and Mr. West, the 
appraiser called on behalf of the defendant, was $30,000. (T. 368) 
It is clear that the plaintiffs filed their Notice of 
Interest on the property and refused to release the same until a 
Stipulation was entered into March 7, 1985, for the reason that 
they wanted to be able to leap either direction. . If the economic 
situation improved, they no doubt would have asserted that the 
forfeiture was invalid. When in March 1985 it appeared that the 
economic situation was getting progressively worse, plaintiffs 
apparently elected to abandon the property and try to obtain 
damages under Perkins v. Spencer. The only basis upon which 
plaintiffs could possibly succeed is to attempt to assert that 
real estate had remained high until after the 1984 forfeiture, and 
that then the prices went down. It seems unbelievably convenient 
for the plaintiffs that prices remained high until just after 
they decided to forfeit, and then immediately plunged. This is 
contrary to the weight of the evidence, not to mention logic as 
well. We respectfully submit that the clear weight of the 
evidence showed prices had already plunged, and that that was 
the basis for plaintiffs decision to abandon the property, subject 
to holding on for awhile to see what the economy would bring. 
CONCLUSION 
One rarely encounters a greater miscarriage of justice 
than that presented by this case. Defendant sold plaintiffs' 
predecessors 76 acres for $152f000f six acres have been deeded 
off (or hopelessly encumbered) so the defendant has only received 
back 70 acres out of the original 76. (An additional 5.21 acres 
has been taken by the eminent domain proceedings, and a high 
tension power line crosses the property with resulting severance 
damage to the rest of the tract. 
Plaintiffs1 predecessors paid $76f190.36 on the 
contract for principal and interest. Notwithstanding those facts, 
the defendant is being required to pay back to the plaintiffs 
$71,183.14, which is a sum virtually equal to the total of 
principal and interest paid on the contract, has been deprived of 
six acres of land worth $30,000, and has been deprived of the land 
for at least three years. (The 70 acres which were returned to 
the defendant had a Notice of Interest recorded against it at the 
time of the trial, which the trial Court elected to ignore.) Thus 
the buyers in effect are able to walk off with six acres of land, 
get virtually all the money back-that they paid on the contract, 
and were able to hold the land for at least three years and leave 
defendant a sorry remnant of the original parcel, and that with a 
recorded cloud on the title, with a high tension power line 
encumbering the tract and in need of $30,000 in restoration work. 
Plaintiffs1 predecessors were not unfortunate buyers who 
had an unfortunate economic reversal, resulting in an honest 
inability to complete the contract. Plaintiffs' predecessors 
decided that in view of the damage to the proposed subdivision by 
having high tension power lines placed across it and the economic 
decline in Duchesne County, that they would wilfully, as a matter 
of business "judgment," abandon the project as being not 
economically feasible, and thereafter assigned their "claim" 
to plaintiffs, who were total strangers to the transaction. 
Defendant respectfully requests this court to rectify 
this miscarriage of justice and to reverse the decision of the 
trial Court, and direct the entry of judgment in favor of the 
defendant and against the plaintiffs, no cause of action, and 
therewith award the six acres to defendant, with her costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GORDON A. MADSEN 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARVIN L. BELLON, MAURINE G. ) 
BELLON, B. CURTIS DASTRUP, ] 
LANIS B. DASTRUP, and ] 
A. LABRUM & SONS, INC., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. ] 
MARVEL L. MALNAR, 
Defendant. 
1 FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i Civil No. 85-CV-187D 
This matter came on regularly for trial before the 
Honorable Boyd Bunnell, Seventh Judicial District Judge, sitting 
without a jury, on February 7 and 8, 1988, Plaintiffs being 
present in court and represented by their attorney, Robert F. 
Orton of the firm of Marsden, Orton & Cahoon, and Defendant being 
present in court and represented by her attorneys, Gordon A. 
Madsen and Robert C. Cummings; and the Court having heard 
testimony and received exhibits and having taken this matter 
under advisement pending the filing by the parties of post-trial 
memoranda; and the Court having received PlaintiffsT Post Trial 
Statement of Points and Authorities, the Post Trial Memorandum of 
Defendant, and Plaintiffs1 Reply to Post Trial Memorandum of 
Defendant, and having reviewed and studied said memoranda, 
together with the pleadings, exhibits and papers on file herein; 
and the Court having read and considered the original proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the original proposed 
Judgment and Decree submitted by Plaintiffs1 counsel on or about 
April 28, 1988, and the Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment submitted by Defendant's counsel 
on or about May 4, 1988, and having signed its Ruling On 
Objections To Proposed Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law And 
Judgment on the 5 th day of May, 1988; and the Court having 
considered the evidence, the Rules of Court and the law, and 
having been fully advised in the premises and good cause 
appearing, now makes and enters the following Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs, Arvin L. Bellon, Maurine G. Bellon, B. 
Curtis Dastrup and Lanis B. Dastrup, are residents of Duchesne 
County, State of Utah, and Plaintiff, A. Labrum & Sons, Inc., is 
a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State 
of Utah, with its principal office and place of business in 
Duchesne County, Utah. 
2. Defendant, Marvel L. Malnar, (hereinafter 
"Malnar") is a resident of Duchesne County, State of Utah. 
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3. On December 18, 1980, Malnar, as seller, and 
Ferron Elder (hereinafter "Elder"), as buyer, entered into an 
earnest money agreement for the sale and purchase of the 
following described real property situated in Duchesne County, 
State of Utah, consisting of seventy-six (76) acres, to wit: 
TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 1 WEST, U.S.M. 
Section 34: West half of Northwest quarter 
LESS: 4 acres more or less, beginning 630 
feet from the Northwest corner" of said 
section, and running East 690 feet; thence 
South 330 feet; thence West 140 feet; thence 
North 100 feet; thence West 550 feet; thence 
North 230 feet to the point of beginning. 
TOGETHER with 12 shares of Class D Dry Gulch 
Irrigation Water. 
TOGETHER with all improvements and 
appurtenances thereunto belonging. 
EXCEPTING AND RESERVING all oil, gas and 
mineral rights. 
SUBJECT to all existing rights-of-way and 
easements of record. 
The earnest money agreement provided for the release of six (6) 
acres of said seventy-six (76) acre tract to Elder at the time of 
closing. Said six (6) acre tract is situated in Duchesne County, 
State of Utah, and is more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at the Northwest corner of Section 
34, Township 2 South, Range 1 West, Uintah 
Special Meridian and running thence East 
630.0 feet; thence South 230.0 feet; thence 
East 550.0 feet; thence South 100.0 feet more 
or less to the South line of the North Half 
of the North Half of the Northwest quarter of 
3 
1 the Northwest Quarter of said section; thence 
West 1180.0 feet more or less to the West 
2 line of said Section; thence North 330.0 feet 
more or less to the point of beginning. 6.04 
3 acres more or less. 
4 4. On December 19, 1980, Malnar and Elder entered 
5 into a real estate contract for the sale and purchase of said 
Q seventy-six (76) acres based upon the December 18, 1980, earnest 
7 money agreement; however, the real estate contract made no 
8 mention of the release to Elder of the six (6) acre parcel at 
9 closing. 
10 5. On the same date, to wit: December 19, 1980, 
11 Malnar and Elder executed an escrow agreement with First Security 
12 Bank of Utah, Roosevelt office, as escrow agent, and deposited 
13 with the agent said real estate contract, a copy of a warranty 
14 I deed dated December 19, 1980, from Malnar to Elder conveying said 
1 5 [I six (6) acre tract, a copy of a notice of Elder ls interest in the 
16 I seventy-six (76) acres dated December 19, 1980, and a quit-claim 
17 jl deed from Elder to Malnar dated December 19, 1980, and covering 
18 j the entire seventy-six (76) acre tract. 
19 6. The original warranty deed covering the six (6) 
20 acre tract was immediately delivered to Elder and Elder recorded 
21 said warranty deed on December 29, 1980, thereby placing the 
il 
22 Jl legal title to said six (6) acres in his name, 
23 
24 
7. The purchase price for the seventy-six (76) acres 
was ONE HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO THOUSAND DOLLARS ($152,000.00). The 
real estate contract called for a down payment of TWENTY-THREE 
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($23,500.00) at closing, interest 
at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum on the unpaid balance, 
and subsequent annual payments. 
8. On December 31, 1980, Elder assigned his interest 
in the real estate contract with Malnar to Clark Jenkins, Richard 
McCarver, Thomas C. Mabey, and J. McRae Johnson (hereinafter 
"Jenkins, et al. ") by means of a contract of sale covering the 
same seventy-six (76) acre tract as was sold by Malnar to Elder, 
as aforesaid. 
9. On January 30, 1987, Elder and Clark Jenkins, et 
al. , assigned all of their right, title and interest in and to 
the real estate contract with Malnar and the seventy-six (76) 
acres described therein to the Plaintiffs above named for good 
and valuable consideration. 
10. Elder defaulted on the December 19, 1980, real 
estate contract with Malnar by failing to make the annual payment 
due on December 19, 1983, or within thirty (30) days thereafter. 
On January 19, 1984, Malnar gave Elder notice of default and 
Elder failed to cure the default within the time and as provided 
by said real estate contract. 
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11. On February 3, 1984, in accordance with the terms 
of the December 19, 1980, real estate contract and the said 
escrow agreement, Malnar requested that the escrow agent, First 
Security Bank of Utah, release to her the escrow documents and, 
on the same date, Malnar recorded the quit-claim deed from Elder 
conveying back to her the entire seventy-six (76) acres. 
12. The following payments were made by Elder to 
Malnar on the December 19, 1980, real estate contract, on or 
about the following dates, to wit: 
Date Principal Interest Total 
12/19/80 $23,500.00 -0- $23,500.00 
01/21/82 12,403.81 $13,941.37 26,345.18 
02/01/83 14,226.65 12,118.53 26,345.18 
Total $50,130.46 $26,059.90 $76,190.36 
13. The principal balance owing to Malnar by Elder 
after the February 1, 1983, payment was $101,919.54, after 
payment of escrow fees and expenses and with interest paid to 
said date. 
14. On September 19, 1982, Deseret Generation & 
Transmission Cooperative (hereinafter "Deseret") commenced 
eminent domain proceedings for the purpose of acquiring an 
easement across 5.22 acres of the seventy-six (76) acres covered 
by the December 19, 1980, contract and on October 18, 1982, an 
6 
t order of immediate occupancy was entered and a required cash 
9 deposit paid into court by Deseret for the landowner. 
« 15. On March 7, 1985, Malnar and Plaintiffs1 
A assignors, to wit: Elder and Jenkins, et al. , entered into a 
g written stipulation in the eminent domain proceeding, by the 
g terms of which they agreed that Malnar was to receive all damages 
7 awarded in said eminent domain action and that Plaintiffs1 said 
g assignors1 interest in the seventy-six (76) acres would be 
9 limited to a claim against Malnar for equitable restitution of 
10 monies forfeited under the December 19, 1980, real estate 
H contract. 
12 16. On or about the 30th day of March, 1985, Malnar 
13 received the sum of NINE THOUSAND SEVENTY-FIVE DOLLARS 
14 ($9,075.00) and on or about the 30th day of December, 1986, she 
15 received the sum of THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND DOLLARS ($32,000.00), for 
16 a total of FORTY-ONE THOUSAND SEVENTY-FIVE DOLLARS ($41,075.00) 
17 from said eminent domain proceedings. She expended, by way of 
18 costs and attorneyfs fees in said action, the sum of SIX THOUSAND 
19 DOLLARS ($6,000.00), giving her net receipts from the eminent 
20 domain proceedings of THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND SEVENTY FIVE DOLLARS 
21 ($35,075.00). 
22 17. The fair market value of the SEVENTY-SIX (76) 
23 acres, as of February 3, 1984, the date that Malnar took 
24 
possession of said real property and recorded her quit-claim 
deed, was ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND DOLLARS ($180,000.00), and 
the fair market value of the six (6) acres previously deeded from 
the seventy-six (76) acres to Elder in 1980 was THIRTY THOUSAND 
DOLLARS ($30,000.00), leaving a fair market value of the 
remaining seventy (70) acres as of that date of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY 
THOUSAND DOLLARS ($150,000.00). 
18. Malnar received, on the December 19, 1980, real 
estate contract with Elder, which called for a purchase price of 
ONE HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO THOUSAND DOLLARS ($152,000.00), the 
following sums: FIFTY THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED THIRTY AND 46/100 
DOLLARS ($50,130.46) principal; TWENTY-SIX THOUSAND FIFTY -NINE 
AND 90/100 DOLLARS ($26,059.90) interest; and THIRTY-FIVE 
THOUSAND SEVENTY-FIVE DOLLARS (35,075.00) net receipts from the 
eminent domain proceedings; and, upon exercising her right of 
forfeiture under said real estate contract on February 3, 1984, 
she received seventy (70) acres of land having a fair market 
value of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS ($150,000.00). 
19. Malnar paid the total sum of ONE THOUSAND SEVEN 
HUNDRED SEVENTY-FOUR AND 52/100 DOLLARS ($1,774.52) in real 
property taxes and water assessments which should have been paid 
by Elder. 
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20. It was the intent of Elder and Malnar that Malnar 
receive title to the said six (6) acre parcel at closing on 
December 19, 1980
 f as is more particularly evidenced by the 
following: the delivery to Elder on December 19, 1980, of the 
warranty deed covering the six (6) acres and the recording by 
Elder of said deed; the earnest money agreement dated December 
18, 1980, which provided that the said six (6) acre tract be 
conveyed to Elder; and the treatment by Elder after closing on 
December 19, 1980, of the said six (6) acres as his sole property 
by making conveyances and assignments with respect thereto. 
21. The inclusion of said six (6) acre tract in the 
legal description of real property covered by the real estate 
contract dated December 19, 1980, and the quit-claim deed which 
was placed in escrow on that date and which was recorded by 
Malnar on February 3, 1984, was the result of a mutual mistake of 
fact on the part of Malnar and Elder and the drafter of said 
instruments who carried forward the legal description of the 
seventy-six (76) acres and neglected to exclude the six (6) acres 
covered in the warranty deed from Malnar to Elder. 
22. At the time of default by Elder, as aforesaid, 
Malnar did not receive good marketable title to said six (6) acre 
parcel even though it was included in the legal description of 
the quit-claim deed recorded by Malnar on February 3, 1984. 
9 
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9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
15 
23. The only way that the Court can calculate the 
damage to Defendant, by reason of the breach of the real estate 
contract by Elder, in an equitable manner is to use the loss of 
interest approach. Rental value of the real property in question 
is hard to assess because of the problems relative to the legal 
title to the six (6) acres and the existence of the eminent 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 I domain suit which was initiated during the time that the real 
estate contract was in force. In calculating said damages the 
Court finds that Malnar is entitled to retain the interest paid 
on the real estate contract on January 21, 1982 and February 1, 
1983. In addition thereto, she is entitled to interest on the 
unpaid balance of said contract, from February 1, 1983, to 
February 3, 1984, in the amount of TEN THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED 
14 J| FORTY-SEVEN AND 80/100 DOLLARS ($10,247.80) 
24. The Court, after making an analysis of the 
jg || foregoing facts, finds: 
ii 
1 7 jj (a) The following amount was 
paid by Elder on the December 19, 
18 ! 1980, real estate contract 
($50,130.46 principal plus 
19 $26,059.90 interest plus $35,075.00 
I net eminent domain proceeds): $111,265.36 
20 
I (b) Malnar sustained the 
21 I following damages ($26,059.90 
j interest on unpaid contract 
22 j balance from December 19, 1980, 
ii to February 1, 1983, and 
23 $10,247.80 from February 1, 
1 1983, to February 3, 1984; 
24 
10 
$1,774.52 in taxes and water 
assessments paid by Malnar 
for Elder; and $2,000.00 
difference between contract 
price of $152,000.00 and fair 
market value of property 
returned on February 3, 1984): $ 40,082.22 
(c) The difference between 
the amounts calculated in sub-
paragraphs (a) and (b) of this 
paragraph numbered 24 should be 
returned by Malnar to Plaintiffs, 
to wit: $ 71,183.14 
25. The Court, after making an analysis of the 
foregoing facts, finds that the finding made in sub-paragraph (c) 
of paragraph numbered 24 hereof is further supported by the 
following: 
(a) The principal balance 
owing on the December 19, 1980, 
contract, after the February 1, 
1983, payment ($101,919.54), plus 
interest on said principal 
balance from February 1, 1983, 
to February 3, 1984 ($10,247.80), 
plus taxes and assessments paid 
by Malnar for Elder ($1,774.52) 
amounts to the following sum 
which Malnar might reasonably 
have expected to recover had 
there been no breach, to wit: 
(b) The net amount received 
by Malnar from the eminent domain 
proceedings ($35,075.00) plus the 
fair market value of the real 
property returned to Malnar on 
February 3, 1984, ($150,000.00) is: 
(c) The difference between 
the amounts calculated in sub-
$113,941.86 
$185,075.00 
11 
paragraphs (a) and (b) of this 
paragraph numbered 25 is the 
following sum which fairly and 
reasonably approximates the 
amount calculated in paragraph 
numbered 24(c) hereof, to wit: $ 71,133.14 
26. The amounts received by Malnar on the December 19, 
1980, real estate contract and from the eminent domain 
proceedings are grossly excessive and disproportionate to the 
amount of actual damage suffered by her, and Plaintiffs1 
assignors, to wit: Elder and Jenkins, et al . , suffered an 
unconscionable forfeiture. 
27. To the extent that the foregoing Findings of Fact 
are more appropriately Conclusions of Law, they shall be deemed 
to be such. 
On the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court concludes: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment against Defendant, 
Marvel J. Malnar, as follows: 
1. Adjudging and decreeing that Defendant has no 
right, title or interest in and to the six (6) acre tract of land 
described at the end of paragraph numbered 3 of the Foregoing 
Findings of Fact. 
2. Adjudging and decreeing that the liquidated damage 
clause of the December 19, 1980, real estate ccntract not be 
enforced. 
12 
3. For the sum of SEVENTY-ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED 
EIGHTY-THREE AND 14/100 DOLLARS ($71,183.14), together with 
their costs of suit herein incurred. 
The Court will not consider Malnar's argument that 
there may be some false claims against her title to the seventy 
(70) acres, since those claims have no legal force and effect, 
and she did receive legal title thereto as a result of the breach 
of contract by Elder and the recording of her quit-claim deed on 
February 3, 1984. 
13 
ROBERT F. ORTON - #A2483 
MARSDEN, ORTON & CAHOON 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
68 South Main Street, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3800 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARVIN L. BELLON, MAURINE G. ] 
BELLON, B. CURTIS DASTRUP, ] 
LANIS B. DASTRUP, and ] 
A. LABRUM & SONS, INC., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARVEL L. MALNAR, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
i Civil No. 85-CV-187D 
This matter came on regularly for trial before the 
Honorable Boyd Bunnell, Seventh Judicial District Judge, sitting 
without a jury, on February 7 and 8, 1988, Plaintiffs being 
present in court and represented by their attorney, Robert F. 
Orton of the firm of Marsden, Orton & Cahoon, and Defendant being 
present in court and represented by her attorneys, Gordon A. 
Madsen and Robert C. Cummings; and the Court having heard 
testimony and received exhibits and having taken this matter 
under advisement pending the filing by the parties of post-trial 
memoranda; and the Court having received Plaintiffs1 Post Trial 
Statement of Points and Authorities, the Post Trial Memorandum of 
' in DISTRICT COURT DUCHEv 
STATC nr MTAU 
J MAY 1 
ETl C 
Defendant, and Plaintiffs' Reply to Post Trial Memorandum of 
Defendant, and having reviewed and studied said memoranda, 
together with the pleadings, exhibits and papers on file herein; 
and the Court having read and considered the proposed original 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the original proposed 
Judgment and Decree submitted by Plaintiffs' counsel on or about 
April 28, 1988, and the Objections to Proposed Findings Of Fact, 
Conclusions Of Law, And Judgment submitted by Defendant's counsel 
on or about May 4, 1988, and having signed its Ruling On 
Objections To Proposed Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law And 
Judgment on the 5th day of May, 1988; and the Court having 
considered the evidence, the Rules of Court and the law, and 
having been fully advised in the premises, and having entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; and good cause 
appearing, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED: 
1. That the liquidated damage clause of the December 
19, 1980, real estate contract entered into by and between Ferron 
Elder and Defendant, Marvel L. Malnar, is unenforceable. 
2. That Plaintiffs be and they are hereby awarded 
judgment against Defendant, Marvel L. Malnar, in the amount of 
2 
SEVENTY-ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-THREE AND 14/100 DOLLARS 
($71,183.14), together with their taxable costs. 
3. That Defendant, Marvel L. Malnar, has no right, 
title or interest in and to the following described real property 
situated in Duchesne County, State of Utah, to wit: 
Beginning at the Northwest corner of Section 
34, Township 2 South, Range 1 West, Uintah 
Special Meridian and running thence East 
630.0 feet; thence South 230.0 feet; thence 
East 550.0 feet; thence South 100.0 feet more 
or less to the South line of the North Half 
of the North Half of the Northwest quarter of 
the Northwest Quarter of said section; thence 
West 1180.0 feet more or less to the West 
line of said Section; thence North 330.0 feet 
more or less to the point of beginning. 6.04 
acres more or less. 
4. That Plaintiffs be and they are hereby awarded 
interest on all amounts set forth in paragraph numbered 2 hereof 
at the rate of TWELVE PERCENT (12*) per annum from the date of 
entry of this Judgment and Decree until paid. 
DATED this / / day of /^^'pSs yf 1988. 
District Judged 
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H I L A L E S T A T E C O N ^ T R A C ^ T 
THIS CONTRACT made and entered into this f<?rf day of 
December, 1980, by and between MARVEL MALNARr who shall 
hereinafter be singularly or collectively referred to as Seller; 
and FERRON ELDER, who shall hereinafter be singularly or 
collectively referred to as Buyer: 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, Seller is the owner and is in possession of certain 
property which property is hereinafter described and Seller is 
desirous of selling said property to Buyer upon the terms and 
conditions as set forth herein; and 
WHEREAS, Buyer is desirous of purchasing said property 
according to the covenants and agreements herein contained. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises, 
covenants and agreements between the Buyer and Seller and the 
sums herein agreed to be paid, the parties hereto mutually agree 
as follows: 
1. PROPERTY: 
Pursuant to the terms hereinafter set forth, the Seller does 
hereby sell and the Buyer does hereby buy the following described 
property being situated in Duchesne County, State of Utah, to-
wit: 
TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 1 WEST, U.S.M. 
Section 34: West half of Northwest quarter 
LESS: 4 acres more or less, beginning 6 30 feet from the 
Northwest corner of £aid section, and running East 690 feet; 
thence South 330 feet ; thence West 140 feet; the nee North 
100 feet; thence West 550 feet; thence North 230 feet to the 
point of beginning. 
TOGETHER with 12 shares of Class D Dry Gulch Irrigation 
Water. 
TOGETHER with all improvements and appurtenances 
thereunto belonging. 
EXCEPTING AND RESERVING all oil, gas and mineral 
rights. 
SUBJECT to all existing rights-of-way and easements of 
record. 
2. PURCHASE PRICE AND METHOD OF PAYMENT: 
Buyer agrees and does now purchase the above described 
property and agrees to pay to the Seller therefor the sum of ONE 
HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO THOUSAND DOLLARS ($152,000.00) in lawful money 
- PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
jipaid balances as set forth below until paid in i;ullf to-wit: 
a. A down payment in the sum of TWENTY-THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED 
DOLLARS ($23,500.00) the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by the 
Seller from the Buyer. 
b. The remaining balance of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE 
HUNDRED DOLLARS ($128,500.00) be paid as follows: Two equal yearly in-
stallments of $26,395.18 each which includes principal and interest to 
due date. Three equal yearly installments of $40,234.16, each which 
includes principal and interest to due date, such payments of larger 
amount being first due in 1983. Buyer also agrees that in the event of 
a late payment to pay any additional earned interest from the date said 
payment was due to date of payment. The first payment shall be due one 
year from closing and all subsequent payments shall be due on the same 
date each year thereafter until interest and principal are paid in full. 
All payments shall first be applied to earned interest. 
3. EARLY PAYMENTS: 
It is agreed by and between the parties hereto that the Buyer may make 
early payments of amounts not yet due under the terms and conditions of 
this agreement, provided, however, that such early payments shall not 
release Buyer of the responsibility of. making the regular installments 
required in provision 2. above. Said early payments, if any there be, shalJ 
be first applied to interest due and owing, and then shall be deducted 
from the total principal due and owing. 
4. ESCROW AGENT: 
The parties do hereby mutually agree and by these presents const i?. i-;:e 
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., Roosevelt Office as their escrow ocj^ i.t 
to hold the papers and documents in connection herewith and to receive 
payment thereon and to perform such other acts as shall be required ir/lcr 
the terms of this agreement by the escrow agent. 
It is mutually agreed between the parties hereto that the only obli-
gation imposed upon the escrow agent is to hold the papers in connccLion 
herewith and to receive the payments as made 'under the terms of this 
agreement. The said escrow agent shall not be liable or obligated to 
send any notices of non-payment of non-compliance with the terms of 
this contract. The parties 
of the United States, with interest at the rate of 10% per annum, 
on all unpaid balances as set forth below until paid in full, to-
wit: 
a. A down payment in the sum of TWENTY-THREE THOUSAND FIVE 
HUNDRED DOLLARS ($23,500.00) the receipt of which is hereby 
acknowledged by the Seller from the Buyer. 
b. The remaining balance of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-EIGHT 
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($128,500.00) be paid as follows: 
Seven equal yearly installments of $26,395.18 each which includes 
principal and interest to due date. Buyer also agrees that in 
the event of a late payment to pay any additional earned*interest 
from the date said payment was due to date of paynvent. The first 
payment shall be due one year from closing and all subsequent 
payments shall be due on the same date each year thereafter until 
interest and principal are paid in full. All payments shall 
first be applied to earned interest. 
3. EARLY PAYMENTS: 
It is agreed by and between the parties hereto that the 
Buyer may make early payments of amounts not yet due under the 
terms and conditions of this agreement, provided, however, that 
such early payments shall not release Buyer of the responsibility 
of making the regular installments required in provision 2. 
above. Said early payments, if any there be, shall be first 
applied to interest due and owing, and then shall be deducted 
from the total principal due and oving. 
4. ESCROW AGENT: 
The parties do hereby mutually agree and by these presents 
constitute First Security Bank of Utch, N.A., Roosevelt Office aa 
their escrow agent to hold the papers and docunents in connection 
herewith and to receive payment thereon and to perform ?uch other 
acts as shall be required under the terms bL this agree n-?nt b>' 
the escrow agent. 
It is mutually agreed between the parties hereto that the 
only obligation imposed upon the escrow agent is to hold the 
papers in connection herewith and to receive the payments as made 
under the terms of this agreement. The said escrow agent snail 
not be licble or obligated to send any notices of non-payment or 
hereby agree that they will simultaneously with the execution of 
this contract, execute an escrow agreement which will govern 
their affairs concerning this escrow, and the said escrow agent 
shall be bound by said escrow agreement only. The failure of the 
parties hereto to deposit the proper papers as herein provided 
shall not render the escrow agent liable for the same, and the 
escrow agent is under no obligation to examine or determine the 
marketability of title, genuineness or value of any document 
herein placed with the escrow agent to be held by it. 
It is mutually agreed between the Seller and Buyer that all 
contract and escrow costs shall be divided equally. 
5. PLACE OF PAYMENTS: 
It is mutually understood and agreed between the parties 
hereto that after the execution of this agreement, that all 
payments of either principal and/or interest shall be made at the 
office of the escrow agent named abo>/e. 
6. TAXES AND POSSESSION: 
The parties further mutually agree that the Seller shall pay 
all taxes and assessments of any kind and nature that have 
accrued prior to the execution of this contract, and the Buyer 
shall pay all taxes and assessments after said date and for so 
long as this contract shall remain in force. The parties agree 
that possession of the said premises shall be as of the date of 
this agreement. 
7. ABSTRACT OF TITLE, WARRANTY DEED, ETC.: 
The parties hereto agree to deposit with the escrow agent 
the following instruments: 
Warranty Deed 
Quit Claim Deed 
The original of this Contract 
Notice of Interest In Real Estate Contract (copy) 
The Buyer acknowledges that the Seller has the option at t'j 
conclusion of this contract to either furnish the Buyer with an 
abstract of title extended to date, or to furnish the Buyer with 
a policy of title insurance in an amount equal to the purchase 
price of said property. The Seller further agrees and covenants 
with the Buyer that the property shall be free and clesr of all 
lionc. pnrtimhmnr^q or lumrrfections of title at the tim» of 
f inal payment. 
8. INSURANCE: 
Since no personal property is being sold, and since no 
buildings are on the subject property, no insurance shall be 
required. 
9. FINAL PAYMENT: 
Upon final payment in full of the purchase price, the 
heretofore described instruments shall be delivered to Buyer by 
the escrow agent, with a receipt showing this agreement to be 
fully paid and discharged; and at that time there shall be 
inscribed across the face of this instrument the words, "PAID IN 
FULL", with the date thereof and have the same initialed or 
signed by the proper authority of the escrow agent. 
10. COVENANTS: 
The Buyer agrees and covenants with the Seller to perform 
each and every duty imposed upon Buyer by the terms of this 
contract; to not commit any waste on said premises, nor permit 
any waste to be committed, as to injure the reversion or 
remaining equity of the Seller. Buyer has present right to 
continue to survey, subdivide and to obtain final approval for 
Diamond Acres Subdivision, during the pendency of this contract. 
1 1 . REPRESENTATIONS: 
The parties hereto represent that they are familiar with the 
premises herein described and to be conveyed; that they have 
examined the same and Buyer accepts said property in its present 
condition. The parties further agree that if there are other 
items of personalty thereon which are not included in this 
agreement, the exclusion or failure to list and designate the 
same does not indicate the retention by the teller or the 
transfer of the same to the Buyer. 
12. TIf:E OF. &6SJBNG3, £BA£K *NI DEFAULT 
It is further agreed that time shall be the essence of this 
agreement and if the said Buyer shall fail to pay the 
installments due hereunder at the time herein specified or fail 
to keep any other covenant of said Buyer by this contract 
imposed, or fail to pay the taxes or assessments on the said 
property when the same shall become duef then and in that event, 
the Seller, after thirty (30) days after such default, shall have 
the following alternative remedies: 
A. Seller shall have the right, upon failure of the Buyer 
to remedy the default within five days after written notice, to 
be released from all obligations in law and in equity to convey 
said property, and all payments which have been made theretofore 
on this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Seller 
as liquidated damages for the non-performance of the contract, 
and the Buyer agrees that the Seller may at his option re-enter 
and take possession of said premises without legal processes as 
in its first and former estate, together with all improvements 
and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and the said additions 
and improvements shall remain with the land and become the 
property of the Seller, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant at 
will of the Seller; or 
B. The Seller may bring suit and recover judgment for all 
delinquent installments, including costs and attorneys fees. 
(The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not 
prevent the Seller, at his option, from resorting to cne of the 
other remedies hereunder in the event of a subsequent default); 
or 
C. The Seller shall have the right, at his option, and upon 
written notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid balance 
hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect to treat this 
contract as a note and mortgage, and pass title to the Buyer 
subject thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose the same in 
accordance with the laws of the State of Utah, and have the 
property sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the 
balance owing, including costs and attorney's fees; an5 the 
Seller may hrye : jud-gmsnE for- &ny deficiency which may remain. 
In the case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upon the? filing 
of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to the appointment 
of a receiver to take possession of said mortgaged property and 
collect the rents, issues and profits therefrom and arpl/ the 
same to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold the rame 
pursuant to order of the court; and the Seller, upon entry of 
judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the possession of 
the said premises during the period of redemption. 
13. IN RE DEFAULT: 
It is mutually agreed between the parties hereto that in the 
event of default or failure of either of the parties hereto in 
the performance of the covenants imposed upon either of them by 
this contract, or in the payment of the installments or any other 
obligation herein provided, then such defaulting party agrees to 
pay all costs imposed, including a reasonable attorney's fee 
incurred in connection with the enforcement of the terms of this 
contract or the correction of any condition caused by the breach 
of any covenant or obligation herein contained and set forth,, 
14. HEIRS, ASSIGNS AND TRANSFERABILITY: 
It is mutually agreed and covenanted that the provisions of 
this agreement shall apply to and bind the heirs, executors, 
administrators and assigns of the respective parties hereto. The 
Buyer hereby acknowledged that this agreement and any property 
herein sold cannot be bargained, sold or assigned to any other 
person or party without the written consent of the Seller first 
had and obtained. The Seller hereby covenants and agrees not to 
unreasonably withhold consent from the Buyer, and that Seller 
will agree to Buyer assigning or transfering this agreement 
and/or the property herein sold, to a third party without 
requiring additional consideration or early payments, so long as 
the proposed third party shall establish evidence satisfactory to 
the Seller that the third party is both financially and otherwise 
a responsible person or party, and that said third party will 
agree in writing to abide by all of the terms and conditions of 
this agreement. The acceptance or agreement by the Seller to 
allow the Buyer to assign Buyer's interest herein to a third 
party, shall not release the Buyer from any obligation or duty 
herein imposed, unless otherwise agreed tio in writing by the 
Seller, 
15. NOTICE OF INTEREST, QUIT-CLAIM, ETC.: 
Simultaneous with the execution of this contract, the 
parties shall jointly execute a Notice of Interest in Real estate 
Contract, which affidavit may be recorded by the Buyer,, In 
addition, the Buyer shall execute a Quit-Claim Deed to escrow 
with this contract, quit-claiming any interest in the contract 
and property, to be released by the escrow agent ONLY upon Seller 
demonstrating to the escrow agent that proper notices were sent 
by the Seller to the Buyer, at the last known address of the 
Buyer, and that more than ten (10) days have elapsed since the 
last notice was received, and that the Buyer has not remedied his 
default. 
16. ADDRESSES: 
The current mailing addresses of each of the parties is as 
follows: 
SELLER BUYER 
Marvel Malnar Ferron Elder 
Box 6 960 East 1050 North 
Neola, Utah 84053 Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Until either party shall notify the escrow agent, in 
writing, of a change of address, the above address may be relied 
upon by either party as being the proper address for sending 
notices to the other party. Proof of mailing by either party of 
any notice, etc., to the other party may be had in any of the 
customary procedures for establishing the same, and shaLl be 
conclusively established, if said address is relied upon. 
17. LOT RELEASES: 
Upon payment of the sum of\ $2j 206-rfrft" in addition to the 
annual payments herein required, Seller agrees to release 1 acre 
lots. The releases will be upon approval of Bow Valley Resources 
of Denver, Colorado. Buyer shall receive credit for all sums 
paid for lot releases on the last payments to >ecome due. It is 
not intended that said -«j2y 200,-Q-fl^  per acre "should be extra 
consideration, but merely early payment for early release of the 
lot. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF we have hereunto set our hands the day 
and year first above written. 
SELLER: 
Qnj32^„J2i^2±i 
MARVEL MALNAR 
BUYER: 
FERRON ELDER C- V T 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of Duchesne ) 
On this / ^  day of December, 1980, personally appeared 
before me MARVEL MALNAR as Seller; and FERRON ELDER, as Buyer; 
the signers of the foregoing instrument who duly acknowledged to 
me that they executed the same. 
My Commission Expires: Notary ublic / 
4 ^ 5 ^ Residing at: 
Recorded at Request of—<$*l<u**y^.}ft1^U*~vU $*&u*«*fr....&./.?. f2* 
at A i S P J l M . Fee Paid $..JSL'JL *^CCJ£^....UJ/?UX^^..J2UA^^ -1 
bX.kQa«^t-c-w<_ C_rf... _ . Dep. KookAzl/A- Pagc-IL^.. Rcf.: 
Mail tax notice to AAdrtai.^J3s^-3.^...^M^r'^J^^^-^'i/-^^3 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
FERRON ELDER 
of Roosevelt 
QUIT-CLAIM to 
, County of Duchesne 
MARVEL MALNAR , aka MARVEL L. MALNAR, 
grantor 
, State of Utah, hereby 
of Roosevelt, County of Duchesne, State of Utah 
TEN and NO/100 
grantee 
for the sum of 
- D O L L A R S , 
the following described tract of land in D u c h e s n e 
State of Utah: 
TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 1 WEST, U.S.M. 
Section 34: West half of Northwest quarter 
LESS: 4 acres m/1 Beginning 630 feet from the Northwest 
corner of Section 34, running East 690 feet 
South 330 feet West 140 feet North 100 feet West 
550 feet North 230 feet to the point of beginning. 
County, 
TOGETHER with 12 shares of Class D Dry Gulch Irrigation 
water. 
TOGETHER with all improvements and appurtenances 
thereunto belonging. 
EXECEPTING AND RESERVING all oilr gas and mineral rights, 
SUBJECT to all existing rights-of-way and easements of 
record. 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor , this 19 th 
December , A. D. one thousand nine hundred and Eighty 
Signed in the presence of ._...£.,. 
day of 
>$$. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of Duchesne 
On the 19th 
thousand nine hundred and Eighty 
day of December 
personally appeared before me 
A. D. one 
FERRON ELDER 
the signer of the foregoing instrument, .who duly acknowledge to me that he executed the 
same. 
State of Utah ) 
( ss. 
County of Duchesne \ 
I, CAROLYNE..MADSEN
 m _$ County Recorder 
in and for Duchesne County, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and correct 
copy of the MIRX..NUHBER_^ 
Book^Sumber^AllOA^Page^SM 
and now on file and of record in my office. 
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
the official seal of said office, this .?A.?..™. day of 
February _ j_9 88 
^T^^L^r^.. 
County Recorder 
^corded at Request oL. 
frt/'ty-M- Fee Paid %. 
Dep. Book Page, , Ref.: 
Mail tax notice to Address. 
WARRANTY DEED 
MARVEL L. MALNAR, a m a r r i e d woman, grantor 
of N e o l a , County of D u c h e s n e , State of Utah, hereby 
CONVEY and WARRANT to 
FERRON C. ELDER, 
grantee 
of 960 E a s t , 1 0 5 0 N o r t h , B o u n t i f u l , U t a h for the sum of 
TEN a n d o t h e r g o o d and v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n DOLLARS, 
the following described tract of land in D u c h e s n e County, 
State of Utah: 
Beginning at the Northwest corner of Section 34, 
Township 2 South, Range 1 West, Uintah Special Meridian 
and running thence East 630.0 feet; thence South 2 30.0 
feet; thence East 550.0 feet; thence South 100.0 feet 
more or less to the South line of the North Half of the 
North Half of the Northwest quarter of the Northwest 
Quarter of said section; thence West 1180.0 feet more or 
less to the West line of said Section; thence North 3 30.0 
feet more or less to the point of beginning. 6.04 acres 
more or less. 
WITNESS, the hand of said grantor , this 19 t h day of 
December , A. D. 19 80 
Signed in the Presence of 
M a r v e l L. M a l n a r 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of DUCHESNE 
\ 83. 
On the 19 t h day of December
 9 A. D. 19 80 
personally appe^ed before me MARVEL MALNAR, a k a M a r v e l L . M a l n a r , 
the 
same. 
signer of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that she executed the 
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in and for Duchesne County, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and correct 
copy of the ENTRY NjJlffi^ ^ 
and now on file and of record in my office. 
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
the official seal of said office, this M5]}th. day of 
February 19„.§?
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WARRANTY DEED 
Ferron C. Elder, grantor res iding within the State of Utah, 
hereby CONVEYS AND WARRANTS to Darre l l D ider icksen , grantee , o f 
285 West North Temple, Sui te 1-D, Sal t Lake City, Utah 84103, for 
good and valuable c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , the f o l l o w i n g descr ibed r e a l 
e s t a t e s i tuated in Uintah County, State of Utah, to wit: 
' B e g i n n i n g at t h e N o r t h w e s t Corner o f S e c t i o n 34» 
Township 2 South, Range 1 West, Uintah S p e c i a l Base & 
M e r i d i a n and running thence East 630 .0 f e e t ; thence 
South 230.0 f ee t ; thence East 550 .0 f e e t ; thence South 
100.0 f e e t more or l e s s to the South l i n e of the North 
Half of the North Half of the Northwest Quarter of the 
Northwest Quarter of s a i d S e c t i o n ; thence West 1180.0 
f e e t more or l e s s to the West l i n e o f s a i d S e c t i o n ; 
thence North 330.0 f e e t more or l e s s to the po int of 
beginning. 
r TV Witness the hands of the Grantor, t h i s __j day of 
February, 1985* 
Lf i~r 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF DAVIS 
) 
) S 3 . 
Ferron Elder 
£L 
rfev^-r 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ^  day of February, 
1985. 
V f. 
f r\\m • * • 
rf^ Commission' Expires: 
Notary Public 
\JiS^^ 
Residing at: (*>OdUA » W * ^ 
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DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBIT A . I 
D^ifry 
NOTICE OF INTEREST 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
You w i l l p l e a s e t a k e n o t i c e t h a t t h e u n d e r s i g n e d , EASTERN 
UTAH RESOURCES, a Utah General P a r t n e r s h i p , c l a i m s an i n t e r e s t in 
t h a t c e r t a i n r e a l p r o p e r t y l o c a t e d i n D u c h s e n e County , S t a t e o f 
Utah and more p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s c r i b e d as f o l l o w s : 
A l l o f t h e West h a l f o f t h e N o r t h w e s t Q u a r t e r o f 
S e c t i o n 3 4 , T o w n s h i p 2 S o u t h , Range 1 W e s t , U. S. M. 
L e s s : 4 a c r e s more or l e s s , b e g i n n i n g 630 f e e t from 
t h e N o r t h w e s t c o r n e r o f s a i d s e c t i o n , and r u n n i n g 
E a s t 6 9 0 f e e t ; t h e n c e S o u t h 330 f e e t ; t h e n c e West 
140 f e e t ; t h e n c e N o r t h 100 f e e t ; t h e n c e West 550 
f e e t ; t h e n c e N o r t h 2 3 0 f e e t t o t h e p o i n t o f 
b e g i n n i n g . 
T o g e t h e r w i t h 12 s h a r e o f c l a s s D Dry G u l c h 
I r r i g a t i o n Water. 
T o g e t h e r w i t h a l l i m p r o v e m e n t s and a p p u r t e n a n c e s 
t h e r e u n t o b e l o n g i n g e x c e p t and r e s e r v i n g a l l o i l , 
g a s and m i n e r a l r i g h t s . S u b j e c t t o a l l e x i s t i n g 
r i g h t s - o f - w a y and easements o f r e c o r d . 
under t h a t a s s ignment of c o n t r a c t dated the 2 5 t h day o f February, 
1 9 8 3 , w h e r e i n F e r r o n E l d e r a s s i g n e d a l l o f h i s r i g h t t i t l e and 
i n t e r e s t i n t h a t c e r t a i n R e a l E s t a t e C o n t r a c t made and e n t e r e d 
i n t o on t h e 1 4 t h day o f December , 1 9 8 0 , by and b e t w e e n M a r v e l 
Malnar as s e l l e r and Ferron Elder as buyer . 
EASTERN UTAH RESOURCES, 
STATE OF UTAH 
County o f S a l t Lake 
) 
) S 8 
) 
by (Z<S/J 
General^Partner 
, 1984, appeared before me 
Is the signer of tfhe foregoing Notice of Interes t 
On the C/fty day of 
Carl Delight who i 
and acknowledged that he executed the same on beha l f of Eastern 
Utah Resources , a Utah General P a r t n e r s h i p , pursuant to the 
authority of the partnership agreemer 
Hy -commission «cp£r*es: 
*# f*/« (y**s 
GORDON A. MADSEN, #2048 
ROBERT C. CUMMIN'GS, #777 
Attorneys for Defendant Malnar 
320 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone 322-1141 
4G 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DESERET GENERATION & ] 
TRANSMISSION COOPERATIVE, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
FERRON ELDER, aka FERRON C. ] 
ELDER, MARVEL MALNAR, aka 
MARVEL L.MALNER, et al., 1 
Defendants. ] 
Come now the defendants, 
Richard McCarver, Thomas C. Mabey, 
STIPULATION 
> Civil No. 7732 
, Ferron Elder, Clark Jenkins, 
r and J. McRay Johnson, by and 
through their counsel of record, John P. Ashton and David K. 
Broadbent, and defendant, Marvel Malner, by and through her 
counsel of record, Gordon A. Madsen and Robert C. Cummings, and 
stipulate as follows: 
1. That Marvel Malner is the record owner of that 
certain real property involved in the above-entitled action to 
which the aforenamed defendants are parties, the real property 
being more particularly described as: 
The West half of the Northwest quarter of Section 34, 
Township 2 South, Range 1 West, Uintah Special—Meridian, 
less 4 acres, more or less, beginnina 630 feet from the 
Northwest corner of Section 34, running East 690 feet, 
South 330 feet, West 140 feet, North 100 feetf West 550 
feet, North 230 feet to the point of beginning. 
2. The parties agree that the defendant, Marvel 
Malner, is exclusively entitled to any damages awarded in 
connection with the above-entitled action for the taking, 
severance and other consequential damages as they relate to the 
portion of the above-described property that the plaintiff has 
taken and now occupies, which portion is a smaller part of the 
larger parcel described above, 
3. Defendants Elder, Jenkins, McCarver, Mabey and 
Johnson agree their interest in the above-described property is 
limited to that of a claim against Marvel Malner for equitable 
restitution of monies forfeited under the real estate contractbetwe 
en themselves and defendant Malner dated December 19, 1980, for 
the sale of the above-described property. 
DATED this T 7^ day of March, 198 5. 
JOHN P. ASHTON 
DAVID K. BROADBENT 
Attorneys for Defendants, 
Elder, McCarver, Jenkins, 
Mafeey & Johnson 
GORDON A*J4M>SE*1 
ROB ERT^CTCUkMI NG S 
By C&&& 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
Marvel Malner 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Stipulation was 
mailed to each of the following at the address shown, postage 
prepaid, the f? % day of March, 1985: 
Attorneys for Plaintiff: 
Lynn W. Mitton, Esq. 
F. Elgin Ward, Esq. 
8722 South 300 West 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Attorneys for Defendants, 
A. Labrum & Sons, Inc., Dastrup, 
Dastrup, Bellon and Bellon: 
Michael R.Labrum, Esq. 
108 North Main Street 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Robert F. Orton, Esq. 
68 South Main Street, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendants Elder, Jenkins, 
McCarver, Mabey and Johnson: 
John P. Ashton, Esq. 
David K. Broadbent, Esq. 
424East Fifth South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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